Using drivers and transmission pathways to identify SARS-like coronavirus spillover risk hotspots

Abstract

The emergence of SARS-like coronaviruses is a multi-stage process from wildlife reservoirs to people. Here we characterize multiple drivers—landscape change, host distribution, and human exposure—associated with the risk of spillover of zoonotic SARS-like coronaviruses to help inform surveillance and mitigation activities. We consider direct and indirect transmission pathways by modeling four scenarios with livestock and mammalian wildlife as potential and known reservoirs before examining how access to healthcare varies within clusters and scenarios. We found 19 clusters with differing risk factor contributions within a single country (N = 9) or transboundary (N = 10). High-risk areas were mainly closer (11-20%) rather than far ( < 1%) from healthcare. Areas far from healthcare reveal healthcare access inequalities, especially Scenario 3, which includes wild mammals and not livestock as secondary hosts. China (N = 2) and Indonesia (N = 1) had clusters with the highest risk. Our findings can help stakeholders in land use planning, integrating healthcare implementation and One Health actions.

High connectivity and human movement limits the impact of travel time on infectious disease transmission

“…Immunization, however, is pathogen specific, and to date universal vaccines for infections such as influenza [ 64 , 65 ] and coronaviruses [ 66 ] do not exist, and novel infectious agents may emerge. Hence, our study emphasizes the critical importance of prioritizing ‘primary prevention’ strategies to thwart the emergence of infections in high-risk areas, as advocated in [ 67 ]. This proactive approach involves implementing measures and interventions to prevent the initial occurrence and transmission of infections in these vulnerable regions.…”

Building a pathway to One Health surveillance and response in Asian countries

“…Ecological niche modelling and species distribution modelling [ 96 ] can be used to investigate and predict the location in which particular hosts or pathogens may be found [ 97 , 98 ] or inferred to be present [ [99] , [100] , [101] ]. Evaluations have been conducted for Asia of the spatial variation in risk of spillover of SARS-related coronaviruses from bats to people, using various epidemiological factors [ 102 , 103 ]. Another study evaluated global bat diversity and proposed that emergence of the SARS viruses was possibly related to climate change [ 104 ].…”

“…Efforts are being made to narrow the list of most likely contenders by various approaches [ 9 , 191 , 192 ] and to seek to identify the reservoir hosts of these organisms [ 14 , 48 , 175 ]. An approach which deserves high priority is to enhance understanding of the routes by which a new pandemic organism might emerge [ 2 , 193 ], and the epidemiological factors which could enhance that risk [ 103 ]. The next step is to develop ways of reducing the risk and preparing to respond quickly [ 16 , 194 , 195 ].…”