2014
DOI: 10.1007/s13389-014-0072-z
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Using Bleichenbacher’s solution to the hidden number problem to attack nonce leaks in 384-bit ECDSA: extended version

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Cited by 30 publications
(48 citation statements)
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“…We have Λ * * = Λ. We borrow Bleichenbacher's definition of bias [42]. This definition extends the usual definition of the bias of a coin in Z/2Z: it preserves the fact that any distribution with bias b can be distinguished from uniform with constant probability using Ω(1/b 2 ) samples, as a consequence of Hoeffding's inequality; moreover the bias of the sum of two independent variable is still the product of their biases.…”
Section: Preliminariesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…We have Λ * * = Λ. We borrow Bleichenbacher's definition of bias [42]. This definition extends the usual definition of the bias of a coin in Z/2Z: it preserves the fact that any distribution with bias b can be distinguished from uniform with constant probability using Ω(1/b 2 ) samples, as a consequence of Hoeffding's inequality; moreover the bias of the sum of two independent variable is still the product of their biases.…”
Section: Preliminariesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The attack consists in using lattice reduction to find sums of samples which are equal to zero on most coordinates, and then use FindSecret to find the secret on the remaining coordinates. It has been described for instance in [42].…”
Section: B2 Dual Algorithmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most of the above attacks succeeded under the fact that the security of related schemes is guaranteed by the randomness of nounces chosen in the generation step. Different with this, statistical biases derived from partially information leakage have been exploited for key recovery as well [12][13][14][15]. This type of attacks are expected to succeed with knowledge of fewer bits at the cost of larger number of instances.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We use the HNM [7,8] to solve the multivariate polynomials and give different lattice models. There exist many crypto schemes which are designed with the arithmetical operations and the truncate operations, such as IDEA, Salsa20, MD5, SHA0, SHA1, SPECK and so on.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%