Use of consensus information in causal attributions as a function of temporal presentation and availability of direct information.

Abstract

This study investigated the influence of two factors on the extent to which an observer would use consensus information in making causal attributions for an actor's choice behaviors. Undergraduate subjects were shown videotaped vignettes of a person choosing a favored item from an array of items and of four other persons either agreeing (high consensus) or disagreeing (low consensus) with the choice. The two factors of interest were (a) availability of direct information (subjects either saw the array of items from which the actor chose or they did not) and (b) temporal presentation (consensus information was either presented simultaneously or successively). The results showed that the impact of consensus information was greater when the information was presented successively than when it was presented simultaneously and for subjects who did not have direct information than for those who did. The results are discussed in terms of role-taking and information-processing variables and in terms of generality of the Kelley attribution model.

The Joint Influence of Consensus Information and Situational Information on Trait Inferences for Targets and Populations

“…First, there may be cases in which a person's knowledge of situational or mechanistic forces is so complete (or perceived to be complete) that he or she would consider consensus information unnecessary or superfluous. To support this, there is some evidence that when an attributor has direct experience with the identical situation experienced by the target person, consensus information is not used (Feldman et al, 1976). Second, there may be particular types of behaviors for which mechanism information does not contribute to consensus utilization.…”

“…Explanations for the consensus neglect effect have varied widely (see reviews in Kassin, 1979;Ross & Nisbett, 1991) and numerous studies have shown that people do use consensus information under many conditions (e.g., see Cheng & Novick, 1990;, 1987Hilton, Smith, & Alicke, 1988;Ross & Nisbett, 1991;Smith, Hilton, Kim, & Garonzik, 1992;Trafimow, Reeder, & Bilsing, 2001;Zuckerman & Feldman, 1984). Examples of some of the conditions proposed to moderate consensus neglect/utilization include variations in characteristics of the consensus information itself, such as its representativeness (Hansen and Donoghue, 1977;Wells & Harvey, 1977), salience (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977;Feldman, Higgins, Karlovac, & Ruble, 1976), and size (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975), and variations in attributors, such as their expectancies (Feldman et al, 1976;Hansen & Donoghue, 1977) and judgment accountability (Murphy, 1994).…”

Covariation and quantifier polarity: What determines causal attribution in vignettes?

“…One of these was that of Feldman, Higgins, Karlovac, and Ruble (1976), who showed participants videos of someone choosing an item, and other people either agreeing or disagreeing with that choice. Participants made use of consensus information but only when that was the only source of information.…”

The Attributor's Unprompted Use of Strength and Direction of Consensus Information

“…One reason why the participants may not have utilized consensus information fully is suggested by Feldman et al (1976) and Hansen and Donoghue (1977). They found that if individuals interacted with the experimental stimuli they replaced consensus information supplied by the experimenter with their own self-based judgments.…”

“…While in previous studies attributors judged either neutral (e.g., Feldman et al, 1976) or quite undesirable behaviors (e.g., Nisbett and Borgida, 1975), in the present study the use of consensus information was compared to judge desirable and undesirable behaviors. Additionally, while previous studies presented two or, in one case, three "levels" of consensus, the present study included six levels that ranged from strong consensus in support of the target's behavior through weaker levels of consensus to strong consensus in opposition to the target's behavior.…”