US Aid Allocation: The Nexus of Human Rights, Democracy, and Development

Abstract

Respect for human rights is one of several factors influencing US aid allocation decisions. Whereas previous research identifies human rights practices as being of secondary importance, it typically does not explore whether there is a more complicated relationship between human rights practices and US aid allocation. The authors argue that the impact of human rights varies at different levels of democracy and economic development. Employing data on 151 countries from 1977 to 2004, this study also investigates whether there has been an increase in the impact of human rights practices since the end of the Cold War. The results of the analysis show that during the Cold War, economic development was the prevailing factor in decisions about whether to allocate US aid. In the post-Cold War era, human rights practices are one among several significant variables, albeit exerting a generally negative impact. These results indicate that shifts in the international environment have, in fact, altered the determinants of US foreign aid. The authors further demonstrate that after the Cold War, countries with low economic development and transitioning regimes are subject to diminished levels of accountability for their human rights practices, while aid allocations to autocratic regimes follow the logic of promoting relatively higher human rights standards.

Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization

“…Most studies focus on the punitive side of conditionality, assessing whether donors punish human rights violations with aid withdrawal (Boulding & Hyde, 2008;Carey, 2007;Demirel-Pegg & Moskowitz, 2009;Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2011;Lebovic & Voeten, 2009;Molenaers et al, this issue). Conversely, some studies examine positive ex-ante conditionality, for example whether or not donors favor democracies in their aid allocation (Gates & Hoeffler, 2004;Hoeffler & Outram, 2011;Isopi & Mattesini, 2010;Svensson, 1999).…”

Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly

“…Thacker 1999 finds that increasing the similarity of a country's profile of votes in the UNGA to those of the United States over time is associated with a higher probability of IMF lending. Barro Poe and Meernik 1995;Apodaca and Stohl 1999;and Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009. 19.…”

Foreign Aid in the Aftermath of Large Natural Disasters

“…However, others suggest a humanitarian motivation is also evident (e.g. Demirel‐Pegg and Moskowitz, ) . While we do not focus on the determinants of aid allocation across space and time, in this paper we find no evidence that political factors are determinants of post‐natural disasters aid surges.…”