2011
DOI: 10.2747/0272-3638.32.1.50
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Urbanization of Capital or Capitalization on Urban Land? Land Development and Local Public Finance in Urbanizing China

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Cited by 280 publications
(158 citation statements)
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“…Second, urbanization in China has been driven by socioeconomic and transportation development, and realized by institutional adjustment in many cases. Institutional restructuring in China involves entrepreneurial commitment by local government to competitiveness yet with reduced balancei n resource allocation and welfare provision (Lin & Yi, 2011, Lin, Li, Yang, & Hu, 2014. In Wuhan agglomeration, counties have experienced administrative adjustments involving boundary change and change in the status/ level, with the latter one seldom been recognized and investigated (Xu, 2012).…”
Section: Discussion and Policy Implicationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, urbanization in China has been driven by socioeconomic and transportation development, and realized by institutional adjustment in many cases. Institutional restructuring in China involves entrepreneurial commitment by local government to competitiveness yet with reduced balancei n resource allocation and welfare provision (Lin & Yi, 2011, Lin, Li, Yang, & Hu, 2014. In Wuhan agglomeration, counties have experienced administrative adjustments involving boundary change and change in the status/ level, with the latter one seldom been recognized and investigated (Xu, 2012).…”
Section: Discussion and Policy Implicationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The substitution of newly increased construction land of existing construction land may lead to the consideration that the population is not the main driving force for NCD [18,33]. In addition, driven by an incentive to maximize benefits of land leasing and the pressure from developers to acquire land, local governments were trapped by an oversupply of land [55,56]. Therefore, newly increased construction land supply was driven by the ambition of local governments to raise local revenue and attract investment through land granting, instead of population growth.…”
Section: Analysis Of Socio-economic Driving Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, local governments fiercely compete for resources and investments by setting up preferential policies of taxation and land prices, which further complicate urban land development [34]. However, land, as a key input for industrial and commercial development, is yet to be fully marketized in China [35]. Under the current land administration system, local governments can claim agricultural land from rural collectives at low prices to lease to the developers in the land market at either low prices to attract industrial projects or high prices to develop commercial properties [27,32,35].…”
Section: Land Supply Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, land, as a key input for industrial and commercial development, is yet to be fully marketized in China [35]. Under the current land administration system, local governments can claim agricultural land from rural collectives at low prices to lease to the developers in the land market at either low prices to attract industrial projects or high prices to develop commercial properties [27,32,35]. Subsequently, local governments monopolized land supply and used it as an instrument for developing industrial projects or revenue capturing.…”
Section: Land Supply Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%