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2015
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_14
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Uranine: Real-time Privacy Leakage Monitoring without System Modification for Android

Abstract: Mobile devices are becoming increasingly popular. One reason for their popularity is the availability of a wide range of third-party applications, which enrich the environment and increase usability. There are however privacy concerns centered around these applications -users do not know what private data is leaked by the applications. Previous works to detect privacy leakages are either not accurate enough or require operating system changes, which may not be possible due to users' lack of skills or locked de… Show more

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Cited by 24 publications
(11 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…Since Drebin has been designed to run directly on the mobile device, its most obvious limitation is the lack of a dynamic analysis. Unfortunately, static analysis has clear limitations, as it is not possible to analyze malicious code that is downloaded or decrypted at runtime, or code that is thoroughly obfuscated [17], [23], [24], [31], [35], [36], [47]. For this reason, considering such attacks would be irrelevant for the scope of our work.…”
Section: Limitations and Open Issuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since Drebin has been designed to run directly on the mobile device, its most obvious limitation is the lack of a dynamic analysis. Unfortunately, static analysis has clear limitations, as it is not possible to analyze malicious code that is downloaded or decrypted at runtime, or code that is thoroughly obfuscated [17], [23], [24], [31], [35], [36], [47]. For this reason, considering such attacks would be irrelevant for the scope of our work.…”
Section: Limitations and Open Issuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Different from the iOS platform where Apple reviews every app for the privacy data access, Android transfers the responsibility to the end users for permission checking [47]. Many researchers have carried out dynamic analysis of suspicious permissions and run-time behaviors on the Android platform [48], [49]. In the static analysis, textbased features, such as app descriptions [14], [16], [31], privacy policy [11], [12], API documents [50], app reviews [51], and source code as text [52], from app markets, are commonly-adopted for predicting the actual app permission usage [53], [54].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[38] proposed a privacy leakage monitoring system to repackage the software and insert the monitoring logic codes. Similar systems are AppGuard [39] and Uranine [18]. But detection results of the dynamic analysis possibly lagged behind leakage events [40].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It could detect efficiently with high code coverage, but is not applicable to the analysis of apps with multi-thread methods. (2) Dynamic analysis, on the contrary, could avoid the shortcomings of static analysis when monitoring the running state of software [11,15,16,17,18]. It compensates for static analysis in detection accuracy, but costs much more code coverage, and often lags behind leakage events during the detection.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%