Upholding the Principle of Distinction in Counter-Terrorist Operations: A Dialogue

Abstract

Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin have recently argued for a revised principle of distinction under which states should prioritize the protection of their own soldiers over that of noncombatants in certain combat scenarios. The situations that they envision are those in which a state's army is forced to fight terrorists on terrain which is not under the state's effective control. Kasher dramatizes the argument that the soldiers' safety should be prioritized by setting up a hypothetical conversation between the state and a soldier who asks 'Why should my state prefer an enemy citizen over me?' Kasher challenges his readers to offer the soldier a morally compelling answer. This article responds to Kasher's challenge by presenting a dialogue in which a commander (representing the state) offers the soldier four arguments which together provide a convincing answer. The commander grounds his arguments in differences in the amount of choice exercised by soldiers and civilians, the divergent ways the operation can be expected to impact on them, the different obligations they each have to the state, and the likely consequences of emphasizing the safety of soldiers over civilians. The dialogue provides support for the 'double intention' reading of the principle of distinction championed by Michael Walzer.

Penerapan Distinction Principle Dalam Perundang-Undangan di Indonesia

“…Jantung dari aturan-aturan ini adalah prinsip pembedaan, yang melawan gagasan perang membabi buta dan mengharuskan penduduk sipil dan objek sipil harus dibedakan dari sasaran militer, ISSN: 1978-1520 dan operasi diarahkan hanya terhadap objek atau sasaran militer. 33 Pembedaan adalah satu-satunya prinsip paling penting untuk perlindungan korban konflik bersenjata dan merupakan prinsip hukum kebiasaan yang berlaku untuk semua jenis konflik bersenjata. 34 Prinsip ini salah satunya tertuang dalam Konvensi Jenewa 1949.…”

Intentions and Consequences in Military Ethics

“…Some, therefore, are not so convinced that we really have far-reaching obligations to strangers in times of war. It has, for instance, been a topic of debate in this journal whether or not soldiers can be subjected to higher risks with the purpose of lowering the risks for foreign civilians (Kasher & Yadlin 2005;Plaw 2010; see also Kasher & Yadlin 2009;Walzer & Margalit 2009). It seems, indeed, somewhat presumptuous to expect military personnel to run risks on behalf of strangers, while most of us do not feel an obligation to donate most of our surplus money to, say, hunger or malaria fighting organizations.…”