Up in Smoke: From Legislation to Litigation in Tobacco Politics

When performativity fails: Implications for Critical Management Studies

“…Anti-tobacco lobby groups pressured the state to act, backed by scientists with a strong concern for public health (Derthick, 2011).…”

Cancer Prevention through Stealth: Science, Policy Advocacy, and Multilevel Governance in the Establishment of a “National Tobacco Control Regime” in the United States: Table 1

“…As Mayes and Oliver (2012: 188) describe it, "The U.S. tobacco control movement has made significant progress in recent decades because of a combination of top-down policy change such as advertising restrictions and steep increases in excise taxes on tobacco products, grassroots efforts to limit secondhand exposure and make smoking socially unacceptable, and clinical intervention and management." Despite this claim, most research finds that until recently the US federal govemment has been weak on tobacco control, with policy led by the states and localities (Marmor and Lieberman 2004;Wilensky 2002;Studlar 2002;Warner 2000;Derthick 2002). The advertising limits and steep increases in excise taxes cited were achieved primarily by the states, including through the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) of 1998.…”

“…Multiple studies (Studlar 2002(Studlar , 2010NCI 1993NCI , 2000 have found that much of the effort for tobacco control in the United States comes from lower levels of government, including states, counties, and municipalities. In fact, it took the unusual episode of combining the power of the state attorneys general to effectuate a "national" tobacco control regime through the MSA in 1998, after the US Senate had refused to ratify a similar statetobacco company agreement (Studlar 2002;Derthick 2002).…”

“…Factors involved in these explanations include changing policy frames for cigarette smoking (Baumgartner and Jones 1993;Albaek, Green-Pedersen, and Nielsen 2007;Nathanson 1999;Bayer and Colgrove 2004), a strong grassroots activist movement against tobacco in some locales, such as California (Nathanson 1999;Glantz and Balbach 2000), selective action against tobacco by some states and local governments, and the comparatively unusual US tactic of using litigation as a successful instrument against tobacco (Jacobson and Warner 1999;Derthick 2002).…”

Litigating the “Public Interest” in the Gilded Age: Common Law Business Regulation by Nineteenth-Century State Attorneys General

“…The most prominent recent litigation campaign involved the numerous SAG lawsuits targeting the nation's largest tobacco firms in the late 1990s, which ultimately ended in a massive $200+ billion settlement containing new regulations on the industry and involving nearly all the nation's SAGs. 127 Among other causes of action in this litigation, SAGs included claims for public nuisance, arguing that the tobacco companies' marketing and distribution practices "intentionally and unreasonably interfered with the public's right to be free from unwarranted injury, disease and sickness, and have caused damage to the public health, the public safety and the general welfare of the citizens." 128 While having a significant impact on national tobacco regulation, this effort occurred in the face of congressional and administrative inaction on the issue.…”