Untangling two questions about mental representation

Ramsey, William

doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.01.004

Cited by 43 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 14 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…The following empirical illustration should illuminate our view. In the philosophical literature, hippocampal spatial maps in rats have been proposed as a good example of an internal S-representation (Ramsey 2016 ; Rescorla 2009 ; Shea 2014 ). The rat’s hippocampus is thought to implement an internal map of the spatial layout of the environment, encoded in a Cartesian coordinate system.…”

Section: Exploiting Structural Similarity: a Mechanistic-interventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural representations: causally relevant and different from detectors

Gładziejewski

Miłkowski

2017

Biol Philos

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This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two.

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Section: Exploiting Structural Similarity: a Mechanistic-interventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural representations: causally relevant and different from detectors

Gładziejewski

Miłkowski

2017

Biol Philos

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“…In functional terms, we would like to know what different types of representations perhaps have in common, qua representation. Neither commonsense psychology nor computationalism tells us much about the sort causal/physical conditions that bestow upon brain states the functional role of representing (at least not directly).” ([ 43 ], p. 6, emphasis added)…”

Section: Introduction: Neural Representations and Their (Dis)contementioning

confidence: 99%

Is the Free-Energy Principle a Formal Theory of Semantics? From Variational Density Dynamics to Neural and Phenotypic Representations

Ramstead

Friston

Hipólito

2020

Entropy

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The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance—in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations—is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account—an organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the ‘aboutness’ or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.

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“…10 Of course, to account for false representation detection, one needs first to account for false representation as such, and this in turn requires some theory of content or, in other words, of how the representation's accuracy or truth conditions are determined. Although in the present article I am concerned with representational function and not representational content -with what it is to function as a representation rather than with how it is determined what the representation is about (see Ramsey, 2007Ramsey, , 2015 -let me briefly sketch what content might be on the view I am advocating. Whenever the representation consumer's activity is guided by the representational vehicle, there are two senses in which a representational "object" is involved.…”

Section: Error Detection Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective

Gładziejewski

2015

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

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Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition.

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Untangling two questions about mental representation

Cited by 43 publications

References 14 publications

Structural representations: causally relevant and different from detectors

Structural representations: causally relevant and different from detectors

Is the Free-Energy Principle a Formal Theory of Semantics? From Variational Density Dynamics to Neural and Phenotypic Representations

Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective

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