Unreflective Action and the Argument From Speed

Gottlieb, Gabriel

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01400.x

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Creo que el argumento fenomenológico del contenido sin objetos no es exitoso. Una primera inquietud acerca de esta posición es qué tan apropiado es el testimonio fenomenológico como instrumento argumentativo en este contexto, tanto por principio, como debido a ciertas anomalías del testimonio de expertos (Gottlieb 2011). A esto se puede añadir que el testimonio de expertos a veces parece desafiar las descripciones fenomenológicas de Dreyfus (Montero 2013), sin contar que en muchos casos varía ostensiblemente.…”

Section: El Argumento Fenomenológico Del Contenido Sin Objetosunclassified

Racionalidad y acción no reflexiva. El debate Dreyfus-McDowell

Hernández

2015

CRHF

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El debate reciente iniciado por Hubert Dreyfus y John McDowell ha llamado la atención sobre la relación entre racionalidad y acción no reflexiva. En este artículo propongo una forma de especificar el desacuerdo entre quienes llamaré intelectualistas y antiintelectualistas. A la luz de esta propuesta arguyo que el principal argumento antiintelectualista sólo tiene éxito si se acepta al menos uno de tres presupuestos implícitos que están lejos de ser autoevidentes y cuya verdad es puesta en duda por fenómenos familiares. Termino con consideraciones que sugieren que el intelectualista ha quedado en una mejor posición argumentativa.

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Section: El Argumento Fenomenológico Del Contenido Sin Objetosunclassified

Racionalidad y acción no reflexiva. El debate Dreyfus-McDowell

Hernández

2015

CRHF

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“…Dreyfus even concludes that expert know-how does not require self-conscious awareness and is even diminished by it. Recently, philosophers have critically engaged Dreyfus's account of self-consciousness (Zahavi 2013) 1 , appeals to phenomenology (Colombo 2013;Gottlieb 2011), speed (Gottlieb 2011), and rationality (Schear 2011), yet his model of the choking effect has largely remained intact. While some critiques have questioned Dreyfus's insistence that expert absorbed coping is mindless (Montero 2010;Sutton et al 2011), his reliance on an anti-representational model of embodied action or absorbed coping remains unchallenged.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, agents choke when representational activities inform embodied coping. Dreyfus's assumption that representation requires reflection is questionable, particularly since there is good reason to view representations, rules, and concepts as informing perception and action independent of any explicit inferential or reflective activity (Gottlieb 2011). Philosophers and neuroscientists who hold that there are conceptual representations involved in perception (McDowell 1994;Sellars 1997) or motor representations in motor skills (Clarke 2010;Jeannerod 1997) disavow the view that these representations require reflection to be activated.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Know-How, procedural knowledge, and choking under pressure”

Gottlieb¹

2014

Phenom Cogn Sci

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I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and attention. I also argue that the representationalist model of choking is preferable, since some embodied actions require appeals to representations, something not available to Dreyfus's anti-representational model.

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“…What makes such activities absorbed bodily coping? There are diverse terms used: 'fluent agency' (Railton 2009); 'unreflective action' (Rietveld 2010, Gottlieb 2011Brownstein 2014); 'skilled activity' (Clarke 2010); 'skilled action' (Annas 2011;Fridland 2014). Dreyfus's phrase 'absorbed bodily coping' is not entirely clear and precise.…”

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confidence: 99%

Just doing what I do: on the awareness of fluent agency

Dow

2015

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Hubert Dreyfus has argued that cases of absorbed bodily coping show that there is no room for self-awareness in flow experiences of experts. In this paper, I argue against Dreyfus' maxim of vanishing self-awareness by suggesting that awareness of agency is present in expert bodily action. First, I discuss the phenomenon of absorbed bodily coping by discussing flow experiences involved in expert bodily action: merging into the flow; immersion in the flow; emergence out of flow. I argue against the claim that flow experience does not involve an awareness of agency for each of these features, while conceding that fluent agency does not involve self-awareness in the thetic sense. I challenge the assumption that the awareness of fluent agency must be understood in terms of a thetic awareness of agency. Instead, I develop an Anscombean account of the awareness of fluent agency in terms of the phenomenal character of knowing one's aims. I respond to the challenge that if an Anscombean account of the awareness of agency is to succeed, then agents must be able to answer Anscombean questions. I consider the objection that awareness of agency is not a form of self-awareness by outlining an account of self-awareness as self-synthesis that is distinct from self-perception and selfascription, but which makes room for self-awareness in expert bodily action.

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Unreflective Action and the Argument From Speed

Cited by 11 publications

References 29 publications

Racionalidad y acción no reflexiva. El debate Dreyfus-McDowell

Racionalidad y acción no reflexiva. El debate Dreyfus-McDowell

“Know-How, procedural knowledge, and choking under pressure”

Just doing what I do: on the awareness of fluent agency

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