Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study (by Rosemarie Nagel)

Kagel, John H.; Penta, Antonio

doi:10.4324/9781003019121-10

Cited by 114 publications

(211 citation statements)

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“…Strategies identified by the evolutionary algorithm convergence approximately to the Nash equilibrium after 20 iterations in average, and displays stability once these outcomes have been obtained. The resulting convergence curves of Figures 5 and 6 are quite similar to the experimental results on evolution of strategies of Nagel (1995) and Duffy and Nagel (1997).…”

Section: Convergence Of Learning With Analogy-partitions In Persisten...supporting

confidence: 79%

“…Equilibrium emerges as a result of infinite level of reasoning, or the presence of focal points for coordination, such as the "Schelling salience" (Schelling, 1980). Various experimental studies (Nagel, 1995;Duffy and Nagel, 1997) outlined that while in opening rounds, outcomes were quite divergent from Nash equilibrium, subsequent rounds showed much closer outcomes to the predictions of the theory. Learning models in which the agents acquire understanding of the game and the strategy environment have been popular to explain this convergence to equilibrium (Stahl, 1996;Weber, 2003) without relying on improperly high levels of reasoning.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…The positive parameter p is set to be common knowledge among players, and is predetermined. p-guessing games initially introduced by Moulin (1986) have often been linked to investigations on the behavior of players, and their beliefs dynamics, leading to the well known level k model (Nagel, 1995). Players are assumed to differ in their sophistication by endowment of different degree of reasoning depth.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Subjects were often found to identify depths of reasoning generally between order 0 and 2 (Duffy and Nagel, 1997). The behavior of players in first stages of the game was examined to be consistent with the learning direction theory of Selten and Stoecker (1986) and Nagel (1995) by (Duffy and Nagel, 1997), an ex-post reasoning process in which announced winning numbers provoke an increase, or decrease of the depth of reasoning. Individuals adjust in reasoning depth in this view to the winning number, as a reference point.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary Strategies with Analogy Partitions in P-Guessing Games

Vié

2020

SSRN Journal

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In Keynesian Beauty Contests notably modeled by p-guessing games, players try to guess the average of guesses multiplied by p. Theoretical and experimental research in the spirit of level k models has characterized the behavior of agents with different levels of reasoning when p is persistently above or below 1. Convergence of plays to Nash equilibrium has often been justified by agents' learning. However, interrogations remain on the origin of reasoning types and equilibrium behavior when learning takes place in unstable environments. When successive values of p can take values above and below 1, bounded rational agents may learn about their environment through simplified representations of the game, reasoning with analogies and constructing expectations about the behavior of other players. We introduce an evolutionary process of learning to investigate the dynamics of learning and the resulting optimal strategies in unstable p-guessing games environments with analogy partitions. As a validation of the approach, we first show that our genetic algorithm behaves consistently with previous results in persistent environments, converging to the Nash equilibrium. We characterize strategic behavior in mixed regimes with unstable values of p. Varying the number of iterations given to the genetic algorithm to learn about the game replicates the behavior of agents with different levels of reasoning of the level k approach. This evolutionary process hence proposes a learning foundation for endogenizing existence and transitions between levels of reasoning in cognitive hierarchy models.

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Section: Convergence Of Learning With Analogy-partitions In Persisten...supporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Evolutionary Strategies with Analogy Partitions in P-Guessing Games

Vié

2020

SSRN Journal

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“…We also use data from a collection of 3 × 3 lab game experiments compiled by Wright and Leyton-Brown (2014). In addition, we draw on experimental literature that suggests most individuals cannot perform many iterations, not without substantial experience (see, for instance, Nagel, 1995;Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001;Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004). Powers (1990) and McLennan (2005) also consider random games and analyze the number of Nash equilibria, pure and mixed, while Pei and Takahashi (2019) study the distribution of the number of point-rationalizable actions in such games.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Dominance Solvability in Random Games

Alon¹,

Rudov²,

Yariv³

2021

Preprint

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We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated actions in random games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of at least one player's actions grows. Furthermore, conditional on dominance solvability, the number of iterations required to converge to Nash equilibrium grows rapidly as action sets grow. Nonetheless, when games are highly imbalanced, iterated elimination simplifies the game substantially by ruling out a sizable fraction of actions. Technically, we illustrate the usefulness of recent combinatorial methods for the analysis of general games.

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A five‐factor integrative taxonomy of strategic reasoning in dyadic games

Pulford

Krockow

Pinto

et al. 2021

Euro J Social Psych

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Across two studies, we used verbal protocol analysis to develop a taxonomy of reasoning in dyadic matrix games. Participants were instructed to think aloud as they made decisions in the games. Their comments were recorded, audio files transcribed and the results analysed using a grounded theory approach. Five main strategic reasoning factors emerged: (1) motivation (social value orientations); (2) processing style (global‐analytic vs. local focus); (3) perspective taking (number of steps of iterated perspective taking); (4) regulatory focus (promotion‐seeking vs. prevention‐seeking) and (5) mental representation (gist vs. verbatim representation). Our findings corroborate some elements of previous decision research, and they also suggest that no single existing theory can account for the multimodal reasoning factors found to underlie reasoning even in relatively simple games. We propose a new, five‐factor integrative strategic reasoning taxonomy to explain choices in dyadic games.

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Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study (by Rosemarie Nagel)

Cited by 114 publications

References 0 publications

Evolutionary Strategies with Analogy Partitions in P-Guessing Games

Evolutionary Strategies with Analogy Partitions in P-Guessing Games

Dominance Solvability in Random Games

A five‐factor integrative taxonomy of strategic reasoning in dyadic games

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