Unpacking the partnership: typology of constitutional courts’ roles in implementation of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law

Abstract

Implementation of the European Court of Human Rights' case law-Compliance with the European Convention-Role of constitutional courts in implementing the European Court's case law-Constitutional courts and convergence, engagement and resistance to the European Court's case law-Constitutional courts self-correcting their practices to implement the European Court's case law-Changing constitutional courts' procedures and design to implement the European Court's case law-Constitutional courts conducting implementation of the European Court's case law-Constitutional courts evaluating implementation of the European Court's case law-Varying partnership capacity of constitutional courts vis-à-vis the European Court-Factors of partnership capacity: a favourable institutional setting, a favourable political setting and a favourable attitude of a constitutional court towards the European Court's judgment-Seeking implementation partners beyond constitutional courts * Judicial Studies Institute (JUSTIN), Faculty of Law, Masaryk University. I am grateful to John Ferejohn, David Kosař, Davide Paris, Pasquale Pasquino, to the participants in the ECtHR workshop in Barcelona (Pompeu Fabra University), PluriCourts human rights seminar (University of Oslo), JUSTIN research meeting (Masaryk University), and to anonymous reviewers for their comments, which have significantly improved this text. The usual caveats apply. The research leading to this article has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant No. 678375-JUDI-ARCH-ERC-2015-STG).

Through selective activism towards greater resilience: the Czech Constitutional Court's interventions into high politics in the age of populism

“…Next, we discuss the nature of the Court's activism and how it has been influenced by the changing political landscape. Obviously, if the Court was extremely self-restrained, it would hardly present any challenge to the political 70 • Public support of the court 71 The court's design • Jurisdiction 72 • Framework for review (the conception of the constitution, the role of international law and/or EU law) 73 • Access to the court 74 • Legal effects of decisions 75 • Terms of office and their renewability 76 • Appointment and removal procedures 77 Intra-court factors • Preferences and attitudes of individual judges 78 • The ability of judges to persuade their colleagues 79 Source: the authors.…”