Unmasking Descartes's Case for the Bête Machine Doctrine

Abstract

Among the more notorious of Cartesian doctrines is the bête machine doctrine — the view that brute animals lack not only reason, but any form of consciousness (having no mind or soul). Recent English commentaries have served to obscure, rather than to clarify, the historical Descartes's views. Standard interpretations have it that insofar as Descartes intends to establish the bête machine doctrine his arguments are palpably flawed. One camp of interpreters thus disputes that he even holds the doctrine. As I shall attempt to show, not only does Descartes affirm the doctrine, his supporting arguments are not palpably flawed — even if they ultimately come up short. It will indeed emerge that, in making his case, Descartes employs interesting argumentative strategies that have not been duly appreciated.

Teleonomy: Revisiting a Proposed Conceptual Replacement for Teleology

“…Aristotelians of the time preferred to explain these features in agential terms, as functions of a psuchê or “soul” that inheres in bodies of particular kinds. Yet Cartesian biology was predicated on a rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics and the entire edifice of reasoning it held up (Garber 1992 ; Newman 2001 ). This included Aristotle’s “intrinsic” teleology, which nonetheless continued to find employment in the study of medicine and comparative anatomy throughout the early modern period, most conspicuously in the work of William Harvey and his teachers in Padua (Lennox 2017b ).…”

Descartes on the Animal Within, and the Animals Without

“…The natural philosophical argument relies on an implicit appeal to parsimony. Harrison (1992) and Newman (2001) both take Descartes to make an implicit appeal to parsimony. Bennett (1988) and Wilson (1999) do not explicitly use the word parsimony but take Descartes to infer animal automatism from the mere possibility of explaining animals completely without having to attribute to them minds.…”

“…Descartes could be interpreted as merely claiming that animals have the physiological underpinnings of sensation. If Descartes held the sensitive automata view, one would expect him to clearly assert that animals have first-order sensory consciousness.12 For example, seeBaker and Morris (1996, 30-35) andCottingham (1978, 555).13 For intellectualizing interpretations, seeMalcolm (1972),Williams (1978), andHatfield (2008).14 For parsimony interpretations, seeBennett (1988),Harrison (1992), Margaret DaulerWilson (1999),Newman (2001), andHatfield (2008).…”

Humans, animals and computers: Minding machines?

“…There, Descartes argued that animals are purely beastly mechanisms -bête-machines (gunderson, 1964;Newman, 2001). animals do have sensations and passions; but, these are merely organic reactions.…”