Unlikely Bedfellows? Collingwood, Carnap and the Internal/External Distinction

D'Oro, Giuseppina

doi:10.1080/09608788.2015.1052961

Cited by 7 publications

References 16 publications

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Collingwood, Pragmatism, and Philosophy of Science

Popa

2018

Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology

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This paper argues that there are notable similarities between Collingwood's method of investigating absolute presuppositions and contemporary strands of pragmatism, focusing on two areas-the critique of realism and causation. It is first argued that there are methodological similarities between Collingwood's argument against realism and his Kantian-inspired critique of metaphysics, and Putnam's critique of externalism. Regarding causation, it is argued that Collingwood's view and Price's pragmatist approach have a common method-investigating causation in the context of specific human practices. Both authors place causation in the framework of scientific inquiry as opposed to making it the subject of the inquiry itself. Thus, Collingwood's work proves to be in line with current metaphilosophical debates, particularly in the philosophy of science.

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Collingwood, Pragmatism, and Philosophy of Science

Popa

2018

Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology

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Why Epistemic Pluralism Does not Entail Relativism: Collingwood’s Hinge Epistemology

D'Oro

2018

Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology

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The metaphysics of belief: a Wittgenstein and Collingwood convergence

Gilman

2016

Rel. Stud.

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In this article I make plausible ‘a metaphysics of belief’ by showing how Collingwood's metaphysics of absolute presuppositions helps us understand various comments and fragments by Wittgenstein regarding ‘the metaphysical subject’. For both, metaphysical beliefs are presuppositional; as such, they constitute twin foci – a terminus ad quem and a terminus a quo – without which the activity of thinking rationally, scientifically, and morally is impossible. Finally, although for both philosophers metaphysical beliefs are not susceptible to conventional modes of explanation, justification, and verification, both seem to suggest in various ways that metaphysical beliefs are nevertheless susceptible to a certain kind of ‘practical’ justification.

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Unlikely Bedfellows? Collingwood, Carnap and the Internal/External Distinction

Cited by 7 publications

References 16 publications

Collingwood, Pragmatism, and Philosophy of Science

Collingwood, Pragmatism, and Philosophy of Science

Why Epistemic Pluralism Does not Entail Relativism: Collingwood’s Hinge Epistemology

The metaphysics of belief: a Wittgenstein and Collingwood convergence

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