Universal designated verifier signature scheme with non-delegatability in the standard model

Rastegari, Parvin; Berenjkoub, Mehdi; Dakhilalian, Mohammad; Susilo, Willy

doi:10.1016/j.ins.2018.12.020

Cited by 21 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the DVS properties, a number of DVS schemes are proposed [6][7][8][9][10][11][12]. Although many DVS have been proposed, most DVS are traditional digital signature [7][8][9][10][11][12], whose security depends on many mathematically di cult assumptions which have not been proven, such as discrete logarithm problems and large number decomposition problems. What is more, quantum algorithms have made effective progress, and these unproven mathematical computational di culty assumptions are threatened by Shor's quantum algorithm [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Quantum Designated Verifier Signature Scheme with Semi-Trusted Third-Party

Zhang

Xin

et al. 2023

Int J Theor Phys

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Designated veri er signature (DVS) schemes can be applied in many scenes, such as E-voting and Ebidding use DVS attributes to protect the secret of participants. Most traditional DVS schemes are vulnerable to quantum computer attacks. Then, an identity-based semi-trusted third-party quantum DVS (STQDVS) scheme is proposed, which is safe for quantum means of attack. In new STQDVS scheme, the third participant prepares entangled Bell states and allocates them to the signer and the designated veri er (DV). The signer uses the identity information as her public key and the measurement results of corresponding quantum sequences as her private key to generate the signature. The DV applies the identity information as his public key and the measurement results of corresponding quantum sequences as her private key to verify the signature. Non-transferability and hidden origin are guaranteed by the fact that the DV can generate the same signature as the signatory by means of a simulated signature step. Security analysis has shown that attacks such as forgery, inter-resending, and impersonation are ineffective for the proposed scheme and that even third-party cannot forge signatures. On the other hand, the whole process of the scheme does not require any quantum key distribution protocols, quantum oneway functions, and quantum state exchange tests, which makes the STQDVS scheme relatively simple and more e cient than similar schemes.

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