Unity is the exception. Alliance formation and de-formation among armed actors in Northern Mali

Desgrais, Nicolas; Guichaoua, Yvan; Lebovich, Andrew

doi:10.1080/09592318.2018.1488403

Cited by 18 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Created to safeguard the economic interests of the Arab Lamhar communities, the MAA aimed to ‘officially’ distance themselves from their previous allegiance to MOJWA (Desgrais et al . 2018: 673). Considering their economic interests and the threat to the balance of power under the occupation of Tuareg rebels in 2012, many Lamhar , including influential businessmen with close ties to the central authority, chose to support, and temporarily ally themselves with MOJWA (L'Express 2014).…”

Section: Tuareg Rivalries In Post-peace Agreement Period and Jihadist...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Political nomadism and the Jihadist ‘Safe Haven’ in northern Mali: an entry point through Tuareg relational political dynamics

Bencherif

2023

J. Mod. Afr. Stud.

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Jihadist groups have found a ‘safe haven’ in northern Mali. They have managed this by operating strategically to establish themselves and to develop relationships with local communities, but characteristics of the environment have also facilitated their development and survival. In northern Mali, the political landscape is fragmented, and replete with competition between the central authority and various groups of local elites, who are themselves divided. I conceptualise this fluid environment as a context that incentivises ‘political nomadism’. Using the Tuareg communities as an entry point, I explore the complex dynamics between local and national political actors and jihadist groups in northern Mali. I argue that the jihadist ‘safe haven’ in northern Mali is highly relational and has been facilitated by the form of political nomadism practiced in the region since the 1990s. The article is based on eight months of fieldwork conducted between 2016 and 2017 in Mali and Niger.

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Section: Tuareg Rivalries In Post-peace Agreement Period and Jihadist...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Political nomadism and the Jihadist ‘Safe Haven’ in northern Mali: an entry point through Tuareg relational political dynamics

Bencherif

2023

J. Mod. Afr. Stud.

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“…A core unit within MUJAO also continued to operate as such in the Seeno-Gourma area. In addition, a group that calls itself l'Etat Islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) (the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) has recently popped up in the Gourma, and in November 2016 Ibrahim Malam Dicko left the Katiba Macina to establish an armed group in Burkina Faso -Ansarul Islam -which has since carried out attacks primarily against military targets (Desgrais, Guichaoua, and Lebovich, 2018). This unit operates along the Mali-Burkina border including in the Seeno area.…”

Section: Insurgency Counterinsurgency and Communal Violencementioning

confidence: 99%

Fulani-Dogon Killings in Mali: Farmer-Herder Conflicts as Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Benjaminsen

2021

African Security

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Violent clashes between Fulani and Dogon have recently escalated in the Seeno plains in central Mali. After failing to defeat a "jihadist" insurgency dominated by Fulani, the Malian army has sponsored and trained a Dogon militia, which has systematically attacked Fulani villages, and again caused counterattacks. In addition, internal conflicts within Fulani and Dogon society have emerged. This demonstrates the complexities of the current crisis in Mali and how simplistic narratives about its causes are unhelpful. It also shows how views of the enemy as "terrorists" or "jihadists" are dangerous and able to further fuel violent conflicts.

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“…Jihadis conquered Northern Mali not through military means, but through reciprocal accommodation between actors who knew each other through multiple pre-war ties. The jihadis did not fill an "ungoverned space" since the web of actors who came to control northern Mali had existed there previously (Desgrais et al 2018). The jihadi rulers had occupied roles in the cross-border trafficking businesses, were former rebels-turned-politicians, or were important powerbrokers in informal politics, which the central authorities relied upon in the absence of a fully functional administrative system.…”

Section: Conquering Northern Mali Through Socially-embedded Jihadmentioning

confidence: 99%

Norms, non-combatants’ agency and restraint in jihadi violence in northern Mali

Bouhlel

Guichaoua

2021

International Interactions

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In 2012, several Jihadi armed groups stormed the northern part of Mali and became the unchallenged rulers of two-thirds of the country. Each group governed based on Islamic Law, codifying violence against their enemies in combat and the populations they controlled. Despite drawing on similar jihadist ideology, these governing systems differed significantly in their uses of violence and jurisprudence. What explains the emergence and legitimization of such contrasting norms? We compare patterns of violence and restraint in the regions of Kidal and Gao based on interviews with diverse protagonists of the occupation, including former members of Ansar Dine and the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). In Kidal, the Ansar Dine commander's decision to follow local Islamic jurisprudence limited violence. In contrast, MUJAO rule over Gao used forms of punishment encompassing physical violence to assert political hegemony despite opposition from influential local imams and youth movements. Figures among the non-combatant population also influenced the formation and interpretation of norms among these groups, though less so under strong military imperatives. The findings highlight the importance of searching for a common language over norms of government between insurgents and populations as a key source of restraint.

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Unity is the exception. Alliance formation and de-formation among armed actors in Northern Mali

Cited by 18 publications

References 8 publications

Political nomadism and the Jihadist ‘Safe Haven’ in northern Mali: an entry point through Tuareg relational political dynamics

Political nomadism and the Jihadist ‘Safe Haven’ in northern Mali: an entry point through Tuareg relational political dynamics

Fulani-Dogon Killings in Mali: Farmer-Herder Conflicts as Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Norms, non-combatants’ agency and restraint in jihadi violence in northern Mali

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