Unity in the face of threat? Exploring the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and public support for a common European army in Germany

International threats and support for European security and defence integration: Evidence from 25 countries

“…We understand threat perception broadly as the belief that something, someone or some group challenges national goal attainment or well‐being, that is, as the psychological state of anticipating harm (Baldwin, 1971; Riek et al., 2006). Only a few studies have addressed the implications of perceptions of external threat on public opinion in the context of European integration (Graf, 2020; Gehring 2022), but several relevant strands of literature examine the relationship between external threat perceptions and support for cooperation. A widely discussed idea is the external threat hypothesis, which posits that external threat increases cooperation within groups of individuals and states (Holsti et al., 1973; Kaplan, 1957; Myrick, 2021).…”

A unified autonomous Europe? Public opinion of the EU's foreign and security policy

“…And what factors are likely to affect European's foreign policy preferences under the specific context of the Ukraine crisis? Although many studies analysed what determine public support for the EU as a whole (e.g., Hobolt & De Vries, 2016 ; Hooghe & Marks, 2005 ), only a small number of empirical works examined what factors affect Europeans' opinion on EU's foreign and security policies (e.g., Graf, 2020 ; Kentmen, 2010 ; Schoen, 2008 ). Most existing studies rely on Eurobarometer surveys conducted in early 2000s, which fail to take into account recent crises and dramatic events that happened since Russia annexed Crimea (Irondelle et al, 2015 ; Kentmen, 2010 ), while more recent works solely focus on public opinion in a single country (Graf, 2020 ).…”

“…Although many studies analysed what determine public support for the EU as a whole (e.g., Hobolt & De Vries, 2016 ; Hooghe & Marks, 2005 ), only a small number of empirical works examined what factors affect Europeans' opinion on EU's foreign and security policies (e.g., Graf, 2020 ; Kentmen, 2010 ; Schoen, 2008 ). Most existing studies rely on Eurobarometer surveys conducted in early 2000s, which fail to take into account recent crises and dramatic events that happened since Russia annexed Crimea (Irondelle et al, 2015 ; Kentmen, 2010 ), while more recent works solely focus on public opinion in a single country (Graf, 2020 ). Given that the field of public opinion research has come a long way from the traditional ‘Almond-Lippman consensus’ the notion that public opinion on foreign policy is unstructured, whimsical, and easily falls under manipulation (Almond, 1950 ) – the lack of advancement on this research topic is unexpected.…”

Nun sag, wie hast du’s mit bewaffneten Drohnen? Die Haltung zu bewaffneten Drohnen in Deutschland und ihre Erklärungsfaktoren

“…Die Antwortmöglichkeiten waren dieselben wie bei der abhängigen Variable. Die Operationalisierung der außenpolitischen Grundhaltungen mit einzelnen Items ist üblich und möglich (Graf 2020;Mader 2017;Mader und Pötzschke 2014). 0 steht für völlige Ablehnung (Pazifismus) und 1 für völlige Zustimmung (Militarismus).…”