Unity and Distinctiveness in UK Coalition Government: Lessons for Junior Partners

Abstract

Parties in coalition governments must address the ‘unity/distinctiveness’ dilemma: how to maintain governing cohesion, while sustaining individual identities. Within the Cameron–Clegg government this is a challenge for both parties, but it is more so for the Liberal Democrats as the junior partner. This paper considers how the Liberal Democrats negotiated this dilemma in relation to ministerial portfolio allocations. While the Liberal Democrat strategy of placing ministers in almost all departments has served the Coalition well in terms of governing unity, it has limited the extent to which they have been able to assert their distinctive contribution to Coalition policy‐making. This is demonstrated through an examination of the Liberal Democrats' influence on Coalition welfare policy. A lack of clear policy contributions is potentially highly damaging to the Liberal Democrats electorally, as it suggests that they have made little substantive contribution to the Coalition beyond propping up their Conservative partners. Accordingly, the paper reflects on lessons for junior partners in future UK coalition governments, suggesting that concentrating ministers within one or two departments may provide a more viable means of carving out a distinctive governing legacy.

Beyond Continuity? Understanding Change in the UK Welfare State since 2010

“…This subsequently significantly influenced Iain Duncan Smith's approach to the policy area as Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (see, e.g. Duncan Smith , ), with the Conservatives leading on welfare policy development in government (McEnhill ). Certainly, the new government was perceived as having introduced a significant shift by some activist groups that campaigned vigorously against the Coalition's policy approaches (Williams‐Findlay ).…”

Between Appeasement and Accommodation: Kōmeitō's Policy Influence under Second Abe Administration

“…This study aims to uncover the strategies for policy influence delivered by a coalition's junior partner in its attempt to resolve the "unity-distinctiveness dilemma" (McEnhill 2015;Boston and Bullock 2010) by shedding light on the case of Kōmeitō in Japan. Embedded within the unequal power structure of coalition partnership, small parties in coalitions must face a series of strategic choices in sustaining its own party identity while remaining cohesive to the overall framework of coalition government.…”

When, How and Why Are Junior Coalition Parties Able to Affect a Government's Foreign Policy? A Study of Swedish Coalition Governments 2006–2014

“…Foreign policy is associated with both the need to uphold national unity and the possibility of expressing underlying beliefs on ideological issues. This potential conflict between unity and ideological profiling is brought to the fore in coalition governments where junior coalition parties are torn between the demands of national and coalition unity (Oppermann & Brummer ; McEnhill ), and the rare opportunity to profile themselves in issues with few budgetary consequences. Instead, foreign policy is a matter of rhetoric where the spoken word reflects a party's underlying ideological beliefs (Brommesson & Ekengren ).…”

“…Junior partners in a coalition government are torn between an eagerness to show their uniqueness in order to prove their value to their partisans (cf. Fortunato & Adams ), and an eagerness to show their loyalty to the coalition and keep a united front (McEnhill , 101). Here we describe and compare coalition partner's foreign policy positions with government policy in order to decide on when junior partners have had influence over foreign policy and in what direction ( how ) they have influenced foreign policy.…”

“…In the foreign policy cases investigated in earlier research junior parties have to a great extent held the position as foreign minister, making it difficult to know if the influence would be lower if that had not been the case (Kaarbo , 505, see also McEnhill ). Formal authority over policy areas gives the parties an extensive advantage over the policy formulation (Kaarbo , 508–10; Laver & Shepsle ; Bäck et al ; Oppermann et al ).…”