Units of Behavior

Abstract

1. Introduction. One major concern in cognitive psychology is explaining cognitively motivated behavior. However, attempts to specify the nature of the behavior that psychology is to explain have proved to be somewhat controversial. The aim of this paper is to conduct a preliminary investigation into the kinds of behavior psychology is (or should be) concerned with.

Confusion and dependence in uses of history

“…13 One thing most if not all of them have in common along with the other parts of exhibit (B) is an absence of historical properties in their research. Enc and Adams (1992), Enc (1995), Elder (1995Elder ( , 1996 and Ariew (2003) all affirm premise 2 from the argument above and claim that we cannot successfully predict or explain the causal behavior of certain psychological and biological subjects without adequate understanding of the relevant historical properties leading up to that behavior. The research programs summarized in exhibit (B), even in their infancy, seem to provide evidence that calls into question the truth of premise 2.…”

“…This work follows the steps of Kingsley's lab in using stickleback genetic and genomic studies to learn about the molecular basis of vertebrate evolution more generally (Colosimo et al 2004(Colosimo et al , 2005Shapiro et al 2006;Shapiro et al 2009;Kingsley and Peichel 2007;Miller et al 2007;Kitano et al 2009;Schluter et al 2010). Enc's (1995) version of the indispensability argument: a brief case study Enc (1995) argues for a paradigm shift in how we understand certain classes of behavior. He wishes to clarify and contrast "molar" behavior with behavior that consists in specific muscle movements and precisely describable limb trajectories.…”

“…Enc (1995) goes one step further than Enc and Adams (1992). Enc (1995) stops using the term 'heuristic' and redefines the supervenience base of molar behavior to include essentially the historical properties. The additional data that he considers in the 1995 paper, however, does not appear to suggest that the historical properties serve anything more than a heuristic role which we may or may not need depending on our knowledge of relevant nonhistorical properties.…”

“…They both argue that since historical properties are indispensable to making successful predictions and generalizations about certain behaviors, we should revise our understanding of the supervenience base of those behaviors essentially to include historical properties. Here is the general form of argument used most clearly by Enc (1995) and Elder (1995Elder ( , 1996 …”

“…and Enc (1995) argue that certain behaviors and biological devices essentially include historical properties. Elder (1995Elder ( , 1996, Griffiths (1996Griffiths ( , 1999, and Millikan (1996Millikan ( , 1999Millikan ( , 2000 argue that certain substances and biological devices are members of real or natural kinds, as opposed to conventional or nominal ones, in virtue of their historical properties.…”