United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits

Masten, Scott E.; Snyder, Edward A.

doi:10.1086/467264

Cited by 81 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The Chicago Argument for Why Entry Deterrence Through Exclusive Contracts Is Unprofitable unwilling to train a buyer, knowing that the buyer could use this knowledge in conjunction with purchases from a rival (Masten and Snyder, 1993). Segal and Whinston (2000b) analyze formally for which types of investments exclusive contracts promote efficiency.…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know

Whinston

2001

Journal of Economic Perspectives

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research on capital structure attempts to explain how corporations finance real investment, with particular emphasis on the proportions of debt vs. equity financing. There is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one. But three useful conditional theories are reviewed in this paper. The tradeoff theory says that firms seek debt levels that balance the tax advantages of additional debt against the costs of possible financial distress. The pecking order theory says that the firm will borrow, rather than issuing equity, when internal cash flow is not sufficient to fund capital expenditures. Thus, the amount of debt will reflect the firm's cumulative need for external funds. The free cash flow theory says that dangerously high debt levels will increase value, despite the threat of financial distress. Each of these theories “works” for some firms in some circumstances. More general theories will require a deeper understanding of the financial objectives of corporate managers.

show abstract

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know

Whinston

2001

Journal of Economic Perspectives

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The governance choice is influenced by frequency, uncertainty (demand and technological), and asset specificity (physical, human, and site) in transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1979). Clevenger and Campbell (1977) Leontief (1951) Martin (1986) Davies and Morris (1995) Lindstrom and Rozell (1993) Stiles (1992) Frank and Henderson (1992) MacDonald (1985) Hallwood (1991) Maddigan (1981) Harrison et al (1990) Maddigan andZaima (1985) (4) Microanalytic (TCE, Measurement, Agency) Anderson (1985) Joskow (1985) Pirrong (1993) Anderson (1988) Joskow (1987) Pisano (1990) Anderson and Coughlan (1987) Joskow (1988b) Poppo and Zenger (1995) Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) Klein (1989) Poppo and Zenger (1998) Argyres (1996) Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) Provan andSkinner (1989) Azoulay (2004) Krickx ( Globerman and Schwindt (1986) Masten and Snyder (1993) Walker and Weber (1984) Gonza´lez-Diaz, Arrunada, and Fernandez (2000) Monteverde (1995) Walker and Weber (1987) Goodstein et al (1996) Monteverde and Teece (1982) Whyte (1994) Hall and Rao (1994) Mosakowski ( Nickerson and Silverman (2003a, 2003b) John and Weitz (1988 Ohanian (1994) The positive agency theory literature (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972;Eisenhardt, 1989) emphasizes the role of measurement uncertainty influencing governance choice. As different individuals organize activities into team production, monitoring of coordinated activities becomes a central problem.…”

Section: Transaction Costs and Agency Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing Organizational Economics Theories of Vertical Integration

Lajili¹,

Madunic²,

Mahoney³

Research Methodology in Strategy and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article classifies empirical research on vertical integration under four approaches -value-added-to-sales, qualitative-quantitative, input-output, and microanalytic. The emphasis here is on the microanalytic approach which has accumulated the most systematic evidence to support its theoretical propositions. In particular, this article emphasizes theoretical and empirical contributions from organizational economics (especially transaction costs and agency theories) for both vertical integration and (vertical) contracting. Limitations and methodological challenges concerning the empirical testing of theories of vertical integration are addressed and suggestions for further research are provided.

show abstract

“…(This is the concern, for example, of the literature criticizing US courts for applying antitrust law in ways that undercut the use of contracts to achieve efficient agency relationships. See, for example, Mathewson andWinter 1984, Masten andSnyder 1993. ) A reputation mechanism such as a trademark requires an institutional environment that protects the integrity of the trademark as a reliable indicator of the origin (producer) of a product; this is the function of trademark law and the authority it gives a trademark owner to prevent others from copying the mark and thereby diluting the reputation incentive to provide high quality goods or services.…”

Section: The Problem Of Contractual Commitment and The Selection mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments

Hadfield

2008

Handbook of New Institutional Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits

Cited by 81 publications

References 19 publications

Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know

Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know

Testing Organizational Economics Theories of Vertical Integration

The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About