United states sanctions and nuclear disarmament in North Korea

Abstract

More than five United States administrations have employed unilateral and multilateral sanctions on North Korea; the same tool of coercion exerted on Iran, yet all efforts to record a successful nuclear deal with North Korea has proved abortive till date. This article seeks to address a key question: How do United States sanctions influence the behavior of North Korea towards nuclear disarmament? The aim is to analyze sanctions effectiveness with particular reference to the role of the United States in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The theory adopted was political realism, which argues that power and coercion are major instruments for achieving state’s national interests. This article relied on secondary data which were analyzed through content analysis. The finding of the article suggests that United States sanctions have limited impact on the behavior of North Korea as the Supreme leader of North Korea continues with the aggressive behavior of six nuclear testing between 2006 to November, 2017. The key factor that undermines the effectiveness of the United States sanctions includes lack of credibility and relative menace in US use of coercion over North Korea, lack of airtight implementation of sanctions on North Korea, Plurality of objectives and the indoctrination of North Korea Juche Ideology. The study concludes that the United States ultimate goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) in Korean Peninsula is an inconsistent policy objective of various US administrations which conflicts with North Korea’s national interest. This article recommends setting up eagle-eyed monitoring committees to keep track on sanctions implementations protocols within United States ranks and member states of United Nations with the aim of tightening loopholes militating airtight execution of agreed sanctions.