Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods

Gaudet, Gérard; Salant, Stephen W.

doi:10.2307/2297975

Cited by 99 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…As a most notable example, Novshek (1985) showed that (under some regularity conditions) a Cournot equilibrium exists if the marginal revenue of every rm is a decreasing function of the aggregate output of all other rms in the market (which can also be formulated as a submodularity condition for the pro t function of each rm); and Gaudet and Salant (1991), Szidarovsky and Yakowitz (1977), Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987), Long and Soubeyran (2000) established related conditions for uniqueness of this equilibrium. Interestingly, following a similar reasoning as above it is actually fairly simple to derive testable implications of these conditions for a given speci cation of the functions p(z, w) and q i (z, w).…”

Section: Concluding Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Empirical Content of Cournot Competition

2011

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider the testable implications of the Cournot model of market competition. Our approach is nonparametric in that we abstain from imposing any functional specication on market demand and rm cost functions. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for (reduced form) equilibrium market price and quantity functions to be consistent with the Cournot model. In addition, we present identi cation results for the corresponding inverse market demand function and the rm cost functions. Finally, we use our approach to derive testable restrictions for the models of perfect competition, collusion and conjectural variations. is identi es the conditions under which these different models are empirically distinguishable from the Cournot model.

show abstract

Section: Concluding Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Empirical Content of Cournot Competition

2011

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…When [A1-A3] holds, A5 can be dropped for the analysis of all policies other than pure royalty policies. For other sufficient conditions on the existence of Cournot equilibrium, see, e.g., Novshek (1985), Gaudet and Salant (1991).…”

Section: Two Cases: Outside and Incumbent Innovatorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: General results

Sen

Tauman

2018

Mathematical Social Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly with general demand and looks at both outside and incumbent innovators. The licensing policies considered are upfront fees, unit royalties and combinations of fees and royalties (FR policies). It is shown that (i) royalties unambiguously ensure full diffusion of the innovation while diffusion is limited under upfront fees, (ii) the Cournot price is higher under royalties compared to upfront fees and the price could even exceed the post-innovation monopoly price, (iii) for generic values of magnitudes of the innovation, when the industry size is relatively large, royalties are superior to upfront fees for the innovator and (iv) for any m, there is always a non empty subset of m-drastic innovations such that for relatively large industry sizes, upfront fee policy results in higher consumer surplus as well as welfare compared to both royalty and FR policies.

show abstract

“…The condition of uniqueness 13 as worked up by Gaudet and Salant are widely accepted as very general conditions of uniqueness (Gaudet and Salant (1991), p. 401). Usually, the requirements that…”

Section: The Cournot Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

On Uniqueness and Stability of Symmetric Equilibria in Differentiable Symmetric Games

Hefti

2011

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Higher-dimensional symmetric games become of more and more importance for applied micro-and macroeconomic research. Standard approaches to uniqueness of equilibria have the drawback that they are restrictive or not easy to evaluate analytically. In this paper I provide some general but comparably simple tools to verify whether a symmetric game has a unique symmetric equilibrium or not. I distinguish between the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria which may be economically interesting and is useful to gain further insights into the causes of asymmetric equilibria in symmetric games with higher-dimensional strategy spaces. Moreover, symmetric games may be used to derive some properties of the equilibrium set of certain asymmetric versions of the symmetric game.I further use my approach to discuss the relationship between stability and (in)existence of multiple symmetric equilibria. While there is an equivalence between stability, inexistence of multiple symmetric equilibria and the unimportance of strategic effects for the comparative statics, this relationship breaks down in higher dimensions. Stability under symmetric adjustments is a minimum requirement of a symmetric equilibrium for reasonable comparative statics of symmetric changes. Finally, I present an alternative condition for a symmetric equilibrium to be a local contraction which is more general than the conventional approach of diagonal dominance and yet simpler to evaluate than the eigenvalue condition of continuous adjustment processes.

show abstract

Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods

Abstract: We wish to thank Mark Bagnoli and especially Carl Simon for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper.

Cited by 99 publications

References 4 publications

The Empirical Content of Cournot Competition

The Empirical Content of Cournot Competition

Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: General results

On Uniqueness and Stability of Symmetric Equilibria in Differentiable Symmetric Games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About