Unionism and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland

Abstract

This article will provide a framework for analysing unionist responses and reactions to the Northern Irish peace process. It identifies four responses to the Belfast Agreement that have reflected unionist divisions over the peace process: a principled yes position, a pragmatic yes, a pragmatic no and a principled no. However, these positions hide a common interpretation of the process in general and this interpretation is outlined. The article then seeks to understand why these different positions on the Agreement have emerged from this common narrative and it identifies how contextual factors and the actions of other political actors have done this. In doing so it uses an interpretative methodology and seeks to critique the dominant frameworks of analysis of the peace process and the Agreement.

Peace agreement design and public support for peace: Evidence from Colombia

“…This dimension is critical given that combatants often have competing demands over post-conflict political power, demands which are often linked to grievances experienced in the pre-conflict period. Political provisions in this vein might grant combatants a greater degree of political autonomy, as in the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement that devolved certain political questions to Northern Ireland (Farrington, 2006), or full territorial separation. They might also allow combatants to participate in electoral politics, as in the case of Colombia or El Salvador (Wood, 2003;Holiday & Stanley, 1993), or outline other powersharing schemes.…”

“…This dynamic can pose barriers to peace if the issues that warring actors are most hesitant to concede on are simultaneously those which publics have the strongest demand for. 1 A large body of scholarship has explored the determinants of public support for peace in general or support for particular peace agreements across a wide variety of contexts (Gibson & Gouws, 2005;Farrington, 2006;Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011;. While providing insight on the drivers of broad affective responses to conflict negotiations, agreements are complex and their contents can vary dramatically across conflicts.…”

The Progressive Unionist Party of Northern Ireland: A Left-Wing Voice in an Ethnically Divided Society

“…A process of ethnic outbidding has been in train since the collapse of the old unionist administration in 1972, which saw the DUP gain momentum and the old Unionist party haemorrhage support in various directions. The rise of the DUP, especially since 2001, has been explained elsewhere (Farrington 2006), although it is important to point out that the PUP competes directly with the DUP and UUP for support in working‐class areas. Notwithstanding this dominance, the DUP and UUP vote remains vulnerable to intra‐ethnic fragmentation.…”

The 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement Referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

“…However, a broader analysis would suggest that the Agreement was overall a 'harder sell' for unionism. Whereas it was clear what nationalists were gaining from the Agreement -cross-border bodies, recognition of the legitimacy of Irish citizenship, identity and political aspirations, promise of a border poll, laws against discrimination -for many unionists, it was all too easy to focus on what was being given away or compromised on (Farrington, 2006). This is inevitable in a peace process that attempts to rebalance power in a contested polity; unionists had held a disproportionate amount of power and a fairer balance in that inevitably meant a reduction of that power.…”