Unifying Leakage Models on a Rényi Day

Prest, Thomas; Goudarzi, Dahmun; Martinelli, Ange; Passelègue, Alain

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_24

Cited by 22 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…As a workaround to the complexity of the noisy leakage model, one can therefore establish security proofs in the random probing model and subsequently transfer them in the noisy leakage model using the equivalence between the two. Proposition 2 provides an additional tool to this proof strategy and, combined with results of [DDF14,PGMP19], imply that a compiler secure in the region probing model is secure in the noisy leakage model. Security of the GJR + scheme.…”

Section: Performances and Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…However, due to its somewhat analytical nature, security proofs are notoriously hard to do in it. Thankfully, is has been shown that the noisy leakage and random probing models are equivalent: one implication was proven [DDF14] and improved in [PGMP19], the other one was proven in [PGMP19]. As a workaround to the complexity of the noisy leakage model, one can therefore establish security proofs in the random probing model and subsequently transfer them in the noisy leakage model using the equivalence between the two.…”

Section: Performances and Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Duc et al could then show a transition from the p-random probing security to the δ-noisy leakage security with δ = O(p/|K|) where |K| is the base field of the computation. It was recently shown that the impact of the field size can be relaxed by refining the granularity of the computation [GJR18] or considering alternative definitions of the noisy leakage model [PGMP19].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Probing Security through Input-Output Separation and Revisited Quasilinear Masking

Goudarzi

Prest²,

Rivain

et al. 2021

TCHES

Self Cite

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The probing security model is widely used to formally prove the security of masking schemes. Whenever a masked implementation can be proven secure in this model with a reasonable leakage rate, it is also provably secure in a realistic leakage model known as the noisy leakage model. This paper introduces a new framework for the composition of probing-secure circuits. We introduce the security notion of input-output separation (IOS) for a refresh gadget. From this notion, one can easily compose gadgets satisfying the classical probing security notion –which does not ensure composability on its own– to obtain a region probing secure circuit. Such a circuit is secure against an adversary placing up to t probes in each gadget composing the circuit, which ensures a tight reduction to the more realistic noisy leakage model. After introducing the notion and proving our composition theorem, we compare our approach to the composition approaches obtained with the (Strong) Non-Interference (S/NI) notions as well as the Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) notion. We further show that any uniform SNI gadget achieves the IOS security notion, while the converse is not true. We further describe a refresh gadget achieving the IOS property for any linear sharing with a quasilinear complexity Θ(n log n) and a O(1/ log n) leakage rate (for an n-size sharing). This refresh gadget is a simplified version of the quasilinear SNI refresh gadget proposed by Battistello, Coron, Prouff, and Zeitoun (ePrint 2016). As an application of our composition framework, we revisit the quasilinear-complexity masking scheme of Goudarzi, Joux and Rivain (Asiacrypt 2018). We improve this scheme by generalizing it to any base field (whereas the original proposal only applies to field with nth powers of unity) and by taking advantage of our composition approach. We further patch a flaw in the original security proof and extend it from the random probing model to the stronger region probing model. Finally, we present some application of this extended quasilinear masking scheme to AES and MiMC and compare the obtained performances.

show abstract

Section: Performances and Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Performances and Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Probing Security through Input-Output Separation and Revisited Quasilinear Masking

Goudarzi

Prest²,

Rivain

et al. 2021

TCHES

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The two newest noise leakage models are Relative Error (RE) and Average Relative Error (ARE) [137], which show tighter relations to the 𝑡-probing model and random probing model, [111]. For these new models, the probes are simulated, and the simulator outputs exactly the same distributions despite different metrics because the distributions depend on intermediate values, as discussed for 𝑡-probing model.…”

Section: Noisementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As an example, the noisy leakage models were believed to be realistic, although the assumptions made about the noise and its parameter could be invalid cf. [137]. Within these frameworks, the design parameters, e.g., noise parameter, should be under the control of the designer [138], which could not be possible in practice.…”

Section: Lessons Learned and An Outlook For Future Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Circuit Masking: From Theory to Standardization, A Comprehensive Survey for Hardware Security Researchers and Practitioners

Covic,

Ganji,

Forte

2021

Preprint

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Side-channel attacks extracting sensitive data from implementations have been considered a major threat to the security of cryptographic schemes. This has elevated the need for improved designs by embodying countermeasures, with masking being the most prominent example. To formally verify the security of a masking scheme, numerous attack models have been developed to capture the physical properties of the information leakage as well as the capabilities of the adversary. With regard to these models, extensive research has been performed to realize masking schemes. These research efforts have led to significant progress in the development of security assessment methodologies and further initiated standardization activities. However, since the majority of this work is theoretical, it is challenging for the more practice-oriented hardware security community to fully grasp and contribute to. To bridge the gap, these advancements are reviewed and discussed in this survey, mainly from the perspective of hardware security. In doing so, a clear taxonomy is provided that is helpful for a systematic treatment of the masking-related topics. By giving an extensive overview of the existing methods, this survey (1) provides a research landscape of circuit masking for newcomers to the field, (2) offers guidelines on which attack model and verification tool to choose when designing masking schemes, and (3) identifies interesting new research directions where masking models and assessment tools can be applied. Thus, this survey serves as an essential reference for hardware security practitioners interested in the theory behind masking techniques, the tools useful to verify the security of masked circuits, and their potential applications.

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Cryptographic Divergences: New Techniques and New Applications

Abboud¹,

Prest²

2020

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Unifying Leakage Models on a Rényi Day

Cited by 22 publications

References 19 publications

Probing Security through Input-Output Separation and Revisited Quasilinear Masking

Probing Security through Input-Output Separation and Revisited Quasilinear Masking

Circuit Masking: From Theory to Standardization, A Comprehensive Survey for Hardware Security Researchers and Practitioners

Cryptographic Divergences: New Techniques and New Applications

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