Unicity of the equilibrium in the unconstrained Hotelling model

Lambertini, Luca

doi:10.1016/s0166-0462(97)00008-2

Cited by 76 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Taking into account firms' decisions regarding product differentiation, researchers theoretically and/or empirically investigate how firms determine the timing of launching their products and those characteristics (e.g. Lambertini, 1997;Thomadsen, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model

Ebina

Matsushima

Shimizu

2015

European Journal of Operational Research

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer to the centre to delay the follower's entry, leading to a non-maximum differentiation outcome. We also investigate how exogenous parameters affect the leader's location and firms' values and, in particular, numerically show that the profit of the leader changes nonmonotonically with an increase in the transport cost parameter.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 Lambertini (1997) and Meza and Tombak (2009) considered the endogenous timing of locations in such static Hotelling models.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model

Ebina

Matsushima

Shimizu

2015

European Journal of Operational Research

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“…In the context of proposition 1 above however, it is true that all the consumers want to shop at B. In this sense, following Lambertini (1997), we can say that the agglomeration equilibrium is "vertical".…”

Section: Restoring the Principle Of Minimum Differentiationmentioning

confidence: 98%

Urban Public Facility Location, Multipurpose Trips and Spatial Competition: Equilibrium and Welfare Analysis

Baudewyns

2001

SSRN Journal

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We study the impact of the urban location of one single public facility on spatial competition à la Hotelling. If transportation costs are very low compared to the value of the public service then both firms tacitly choose the facility location without moderation of price competition, in contrast to mainstream results in the literature. In this event, minimum differentiation is efficient. For intermediate values of the relative transportation rate, inefficient partially-dispersed equilibria emerge with one firm at the facility site while its competitor locates at one end of the linear city. We also analyze the welfare impacts of changes, successively, in the facility location and the transportation rate, taking into account firms relocations.JEL Classification: D43, L11, R32.

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“…If α is sufficiently small and β is sufficiently large, the model corresponds to that in Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Lambertini (1997). Without loss of generality, we assume…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We use two standard location-price models on the Hotelling line-one that restricts the locations of firms within the city (d 'Aspremont et al (1979)) and the that other does not impose any such restriction (Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Lambertini (1997)). The latter two papers show that the firms locate outside the city if they are allowed to do so.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional Restriction, Strategic Delegation, and Welfare

Matsumura

Matsushima

2009

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract We investigate the effects of restricting locations of firms into Hotelling duopoly models. In the standard location-price models, the equilibrium distance between firms is too large from the viewpoint of consumer welfare. Thus, restricting locations of firms and reducing the distance between firms improve consumer welfare, through lower prices and smaller transportation costs for consumers. We introduce strategic reward contracts into the location-price models. We find that in contrast to the above existing result, restriction of the locations of firms reduces consumer welfare. Restricting locations of the firms reduces transportation costs but increases the prices through the change of strategic commitments by the firms, and it yields a counterintuitive result. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL classification: R52, R32, L13

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Unicity of the equilibrium in the unconstrained Hotelling model

Cited by 76 publications

References 17 publications

Product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model

Product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model

Urban Public Facility Location, Multipurpose Trips and Spatial Competition: Equilibrium and Welfare Analysis

Regional Restriction, Strategic Delegation, and Welfare

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