"Unfinished Business": Ethnic Complementarities and the Political Contagion of Peace and Conflict in Gujarat

Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South Asia

“…During the outbreak of rioting in Gujarat in February, 2002, Gujarat was also experiencing a period of low party competition and faced impending elections (Online Appendix Figure 4). In Jha (2013), I exploit data from the two months of religious violence in Gujarati towns following the Godhra burning. I show that while towns that were historic focuses of interethnic competition, like Ahmadabad, were marginal constituencies prior to the riots and more affected by violence during those two months, Gujarati medieval ports in general acted as “oases of peace”—these towns were 25 percentage points less likely than otherwise similar towns to experience ethnic rioting in that period.…”

“…religious institutions that promote a version of Islam less adapted to domestic norms and traditions. In Jha (2013), I exploit data from the two months of religious violence in Gujarati towns following the Godhra burning. These factors actually coincided with a drop in party competition in states with medieval ports (Online Appendix Figure 4), increasing state incentives for riots that may have overwhelmed local institutions.…”

“…The theory and cases suggest two commonalities in medieval ports-that institutional systems emerged that coordinated new forms of complementary economic 38 In fact, Jha (2013) argues that Gujarat's experience is consistent with electoral competition creating state-level contagion of local incentives for both conflict and peace: when towns with interethnic competition become marginal constituencies and thus more politically influential, state-level politicians seeking to win these towns for their parties have greater incentives to adopt platforms closer to local populist positions that may lead to enhanced ethnic mobilization and reduced opposition to ethnic violence throughout the state. In contrast, when towns with intercomplementarity become marginal constituencies, their preferences for tolerance may also be transmitted through the state government's platform, reducing violence elsewhere as well.…”