Unexamined Faiths and the Public Place of Religion: Emerging Insights from the Law

Abstract

The article examines certain key terms, such as "beliefs" and "faith" and how these are understood in relation to the public sphere. It examines some writings of recent popularist authors such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, and is critical of the authors' claims that they do not have faith or beliefs. Drawing on legal decisions in Canada and South Africa the article suggests that this sort of terminological looseness has legal and political implications when it comes to whether or not beliefs of all sorts (religious and non-religious) are treated fairly in the public sphere.Arguing for a more diverse public sphere, the article cautions that law should give greater attention to principles of modus vivendi rather than "convergence" in which the attempt is to eradicate legally allowable positions from the public sphere and place those who hold them, and their communities, at a disadvantage. The law must not, by inflating its own role, put added pressures on the liberty that accommodation and subsidiarity require.

Apartheid, Religious Pluralism, and the Evolution of the Right to Religious Freedom in South Africa

“…133 Iain Benson agrees by stating that we would hardly like to ask people to choose between their religious beliefs and their ideas of right and wrong and the public institution they attend or work at. 134 Accommodation then becomes a necessary aspect of life. 135 According to Benson, it will always be a question of principled accommodation not simple exclusion, the "co-operation of religious belief and public systems not, as it is sometimes mis-formulated, the 'strict separation' of the two."…”

“…134 Accommodation then becomes a necessary aspect of life. 135 According to Benson, it will always be a question of principled accommodation not simple exclusion, the "co-operation of religious belief and public systems not, as it is sometimes mis-formulated, the 'strict separation' of the two." 136 Challenges also exist with regards to the right to freedom of association 137 and religious freedom.…”

“…135 According to Benson, it will always be a question of principled accommodation not simple exclusion, the "co-operation of religious belief and public systems not, as it is sometimes mis-formulated, the 'strict separation' of the two." 136 Challenges also exist with regards to the right to freedom of association 137 and religious freedom. The issue arose in a concrete manner in the case of Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente, Moreleta Park.…”