Unemployment insurance and optimal taxation in a search model of the labor market

Geromichalos, Athanasios

doi:10.1016/j.red.2014.07.002

Cited by 10 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Several papers study risk aversion and unemployment insurance, including Acemoglu and Shimer (1999 a ); Rudanko (2009Rudanko ( , 2011Golosov, Maziero, and Menzio (2013);and Geromichalos (2015). In Geromichalos (2015), workers that do not match receive b from the government, financed by a lump sum tax. This makes it cheap for firms to be aggressive in posting, as their competitors all contribute to the unemployment caused by attracting more workers than they hire.…”

Section: Miscellanymentioning

confidence: 99%

Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour

Wright

Kircher

Julien

et al. 2021

Journal of Economic Literature

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This essay surveys the literature on directed search and competitive search equilibrium, covering theory and a variety of applications. These models share features with traditional search theory, but also differ in important ways. They share features with general equilibrium theory, but with explicit frictions. Equilibria are often efficient, mainly because markets price goods plus the time required to get them. The approach is tractable and arguably realistic. Results are presented for finite and continuum economies. Private information and sorting with heterogeneity are analyzed. While emphasizing issues and applications, we also provide several hard-to-find technical results. (JEL D50, D83)

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Section: Miscellanymentioning

confidence: 99%

Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour

Wright

Kircher

Julien

et al. 2021

Journal of Economic Literature

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“…There is ample unexplored territory for empirical work on directed search, in general, and on comparing it to random search, in particular. Some papers study in detail the impact of unemployment insurance using direted search, including Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Geromichalos (2015) and Golosov et al (2013). In Geromichalos (2015) workers that do not match receive  from the government, financed by a lump sum tax on firms.…”

Section: Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Directed Search: A Guided Tour

Wright

Kircher

Julien³

et al. 2017

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This essay surveys the literature on directed/competitive search, covering theory and applications in, e.g., labor, housing and monetary economics. These models share features with traditional search theory, yet differ in important ways. They share features with general equilibrium theory, but with explicit frictions. Equilibria are typically efficient, in part because markets price goods plus the time required to get them. The approach is tractable and arguably realistic. Results are presented for finite and large economies. Private information and sorting with heterogeneity are analyzed. Some evidence is discussed. While emphasizing issues and applications, we also provide several hard-to-find technical results.

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“…An example of the more recent literature on disability 5 A few examples include Baily (1978), Flemming (1978), Wang and Williamson (1996), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Boone et al (2007) Pavoni and Violante (2007), Pavoni (2007), and Hagedorn et al (2010). 6 Examples of this type of model are given in Golosov et al (2013), Mitman and Rabinovich (2015), and Geromichalos (2015). insurance is Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Examples of this type of model are given in Golosov et al . (), Mitman and Rabinovich (), and Geromichalos (). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health*

Laun

2019

Scandinavian J Economics

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In this paper, I analyze optimal insurance against unemployment and disability in a private information economy with endogenous health and search effort. Individuals can reduce the probability of becoming disabled by exerting prevention effort. I show that the optimal sequence of consumption is increasing for a working individual and constant for a disabled individual. During unemployment, decreasing benefits are not necessarily optimal. The prevention constraint implies increasing benefits while the search constraint demands decreasing benefits while being unemployed. However, if individuals respond sufficiently to search incentives, the latter effect dominates the former and the optimal consumption sequence is decreasing during unemployment.

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Unemployment insurance and optimal taxation in a search model of the labor market

Cited by 10 publications

References 27 publications

Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour

Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour

Directed Search: A Guided Tour

Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health*

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