I'll argue that we should give up all of our moral beliefs, except for belief in pleasure's goodness and whatever it entails about virtue and right action. Then we'd accept a version of ethical hedonism on which we doubt rather than reject nonhedonic moral facts. 1 I agree with the consensus that ethical hedonism is counterintuitive, so I won't argue that it's the theory best supported by moral intuition. 2 Instead, I'll present an argument that would drive us to moral skepticism, except that hedonism has a unique way of refuting it. The first half of this paper presents the skeptical argument, which arises from the breadth of moral disagreement. Widespread disagreement involves enough false moral belief to entail the unreliability of the processes by which we form moral beliefs, bringing moral skepticism upon us. The second half of this paper argues that belief in the goodness of pleasure escapes skeptical defeat. Pleasure's goodness can be known through the highly reliable process of phenomenal introspection. If introspecting pleasure's goodness is the only answer to the skeptical argument, our only moral beliefs should be in pleasure's goodness and whatever it entails.
The argument from disagreementThis half of the paper presents the argument from disagreement. 1-4 are premises:1 According to ethical hedonism, pleasure's goodness and whatever it entails are the only moral facts. Ethical hedonism combined with suitable aggregative and consequentialist principles entails hedonic utilitarianism. "Pleasure's goodness" here includes displeasure's badness. 2 Many cases suggest that hedonism is counterintuitive -for example, the Experience Machine from Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books (1974), 42-45. Many other objections are canvassed in Chapter 3 of Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life, New York: Oxford University Press (2004).11. In any moral disagreement, at least one party must be in error.2. There is widespread moral disagreement.3. If there is widespread error about a topic, we should retain only those beliefs about it formed through reliable processes.4. If there is widespread error about morality, there are no reliable processes for forming moral beliefs.5. There is widespread error about morality (from 1 and 2).6. We should retain only those moral beliefs formed through reliable processes (from 3 and 5).7. There are no reliable processes for forming moral beliefs (from 4 and 5).8. We should give up all of our moral beliefs (from 6 and 7).This section briefly explains how the argument works, and distinguishes it from other recent arguments involving disagreement. The next three sections defend 2-4 at length. 1 lays out how moral disagreement must work -at least one party must be in error. The objectivity of morality entails this. Parties to any moral disagreement assert genuinely contradictory propositions, some of which must be false. Noncognitivists and constructivists might deny 1, claiming that moral disagreement need not involve error on any side. I can't do their views ...
