Understanding what was said

Abstract

On the most prominent account, understanding what was said is always propositional knowledge of what was said. I develop a more minimal alternative, according to which understanding is sometimes a distinctive attitude towards what was said-to a first approximation, entertaining what was said. The propositional knowledge account has been supported on the basis of its capacity to explain testimonial knowledge transmission. I argue that it is not so supported.

The process of linguistic understanding

“…To illustrate it with an example. It is a central point of Longworth's (2018) theory (in contrast with, e.g., Fricker's (2003) theory) that states of understanding represent the content of the utterance directly (they are attitudes towards the content of the form "p"), and not as uttered by a given speaker (i.e., attitudes towards the content of the form "that S said that p" where S represents a speaker). However, since both these alternatives are compatible with the criteria enumerated above, we might be in a better position to say which one is right if we take a closer look at the mechanisms involved in language processing.…”

“…1 To account for these data, we need a theory of linguistic understanding more versatile and of a broader scope than those already available in the philosophical debate. 2 Philosophical theories typically focus on states of understanding, i.e., "outputs of exercises of one's ability" to understand (Longworth, 2018). They look for an answer to a very specific question: What is the hearer's attitude towards the content or what is said through an utterance which that hearer understands?…”

“…They look for an answer to a very specific question: What is the hearer's attitude towards the content or what is said through an utterance which that hearer understands? Most influential theories characterize understanding either as a kind of: knowledge (e.g., Evans, 1982;Dummett, 1993;Davies, 1989;Heck, 1995;Campbell, 1982;Higginbotham, 1992), belief (e.g., Millikan 1984Millikan , 2004, perception-like state of direct awareness of the content (and force) of the utterance (Hunter 1998, Fricker 2003, or a state through which the hearer entertains the content of the utterance (Longworth, 2018).…”

Proprietary linguistic meaning

“…Pettit (2002) argues that linguistic understanding and knowledge differ with respect to Gettier cases, warrant, and belief. For recent discussion (though focusing on understanding what is said) seeLongworth (2018).1 3…”

Understanding a communicated thought

“…For convenience, in most our examples we will focus on cases of hearing and linguistic understanding of speech. All that we say is mutatis mutandis applicable to linguistic understanding of written word, sign languages such as ASL, etc.31 The content is represented either directly, i.e., simply as p(Longworth 2018;Millikan 2004) or indirectly, i.e., as said by a given speaker(Evans 1982;Heck 1995;Hunter 1998;Fricker 2003).32 Crucially, the minimal condition on linguistic understanding is stronger than mere recognition of a linguistic form or recognition of an utterance of a sentence in a given language as an utterance of a sentence in this language. One can, for example, recognize utterances of French sentences (i.e., they can tell that someone speaks French) without recognizing what is being said (i.e., without linguistic understanding of this utterances).33 We assume that Terence Tao does not speak Polish.…”