Understanding transnational bribery: a corporate crime framework

Chan, Fiona; Gibbs, Carole; Boratto, Rachel; Speers, Mark

doi:10.1007/s10611-020-09924-z

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Proposed theoretical model: bribery as an institution In order to know the degree of institutionalization of bribery in the private sector, it would be necessary to measure, on the one hand, the devised game rules or restrictions, as North (1990) calls them, and, on the other, the companies' habits that support it with their appropriation. However, like the game rules, which in this case are the restrictions of an informal and illegal practice such as bribery (Chan et al, 2021), this measurement cannot be made unless a sample of companies that carry out this type of illicit practices can be identified.…”

Section: Measurement Of Corporate Briberymentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutionalization of corporate bribery: a measurement proposal with evidence from a Latin American sample

Yepes-López,

Camarena,

Cruz-Pulido

et al. 2023

ARLA

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PurposeThis article aims to report on the development and validation of a bribery measurement index for the business sector, which, based on institutional theory, seeks to overcome the limitations of traditional measurements, recognizing the dynamics that originate the phenomenon and identifying process components.Design/methodology/approachTo construct the index, correlational and principal component analysis techniques were used, as well as rigorous statistical tests, validating the instrument in a sample of 2,963 companies in Latin America, including Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru.FindingsThe result was an instrument composed of two dimensions: (1) anti-bribery game rules, composed of regulations knowledge and anti-bribery efforts, and (2) bribery as a perceived habit, allowing an objective representation of reality due to its internal consistency, concurrent and discriminant validity.Practical implicationsThis instrument is one of the few that focuses on measuring bribery in the business sector in terms of corrupt practices, applicable for both public and private institutions to promote game rules against bribery. Additionally, the proposed theoretical model can be used to measure other phenomena with similar characteristics.Originality/valueThis article empirically highlights different variables that make bribery possible. The results can be helpful in the design of strategies to prevent this type of behavior. It also highlights the importance of designing mechanisms to record information related to bribery and the different expressions of corruption in order to explain its different nuances.

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Section: Measurement Of Corporate Briberymentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutionalization of corporate bribery: a measurement proposal with evidence from a Latin American sample

Yepes-López,

Camarena,

Cruz-Pulido

et al. 2023

ARLA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…For a better understanding of the corporation's role in international bribery cases, and insights into enforcement cases brought by the DOJ see(Chan et al 2021). 28 This figure comprises all known settlements in the given period, resolved though a plea bargain, NPA or DPA.…”

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confidence: 99%

Settlements in corporate bribery cases: an illusion of choice?

Søreide

Vagle

2022

Eur J Law Econ

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Despite prosecutors’ difficulties in proving corporate bribery, nearly all enforcement actions end with a settlement at the pretrial stage. Compared to court proceedings, settlement-based enforcement provide prosecutors with flexibility to reward offenders’ self-reporting and cooperation, and reach quicker conclusions to complex cases. In this article, we explain, such enforcement needs regulation to minimize potentially harmful side-effects. When the difference between a court and settlement sanction exceeds a certain size, the alleged offender accepts a settlement regardless of actual responsibility of misconduct. For the prosecutor, the option of offering a lenient settlement means weaker incentives to ascertain the material facts of the case. Society receives less information about the blameworthy act, little opportunity to evaluate the sanction, and less reason to expect sanctions to deter bribery. We show why such consequences result in under-deterrence of bribery and weaker rule of law. The use of settlement may have a self-escalating effect because the enforcement mode can reduce the predictability of the law, while a defendant’s inclination to accept a settlement offer depends on the predictability of the law. Our results suggest that United Kingdom’s current escalation of enforcement of corporate bribery laws will lead to a mixture of settlements and court decisions, while in the United States firms will continue to negotiate settlements as if there were no opportunity to have their cases tested in court.

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Voltaic Money Laundering, the Dark Side of Fintech

Wójcik-Czerniawska

2024

Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics

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Understanding transnational bribery: a corporate crime framework

Cited by 5 publications

References 5 publications

Institutionalization of corporate bribery: a measurement proposal with evidence from a Latin American sample

Institutionalization of corporate bribery: a measurement proposal with evidence from a Latin American sample

Settlements in corporate bribery cases: an illusion of choice?

Voltaic Money Laundering, the Dark Side of Fintech

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