Understanding the Relations Between Different Forms of Racial Prejudice: A Cognitive Consistency Perspective

Abstract

Cognitive complexity was measured in terms of dimensionality and articula-tion. How consistent they were between different measuring conditions was examined by correlating their measures with one another obtained from two sets of grids differing in constructs, objects (role persons), and tasks (rating vs. grouping). Measures of dimensionality were the modified Bieri's matching score, Scott's D, and Ware's percent of variance of the first principal component, and those of articulation, Bieri's matching score, Scott's C, and the number of groups. The main findings were as follows. (1) Dimensionality varied quite largely between two conditions differing in elements of grids, while articulation kept some coherence. (2) According to the results of split-half method, alternation of objects in a grid contributed more to fluctuation of dimensionality than of constructs.

Racial bias is associated with ingroup death rate for Blacks and Whites: Insights from Project Implicit

“…or indirectly through so-called implicit measures, which infer bias from the speed with which a response is made (Fazio et al, 1995;Greenwald et al, 1998). While explicit biases are thought to reflect relatively deliberate and conscious mental processes, implicit biases are thought to reflect more automatic processes that operate outside of conscious awareness (Dovidio et al, 2002;Gawronski et al, 2008). As implicit and explicit biases are independent constructs among Blacks (Livingston, 2002), they may each contribute to pathways (e.g., perceived discrimination and anger) that have negative health consequences.…”

I think I like you: Spontaneous and deliberate evaluations of potential romantic partners in an online dating context

“…If, however, the evaluation implied by the target's ambition is inconsistent with the attractiveness-related response, the latter should be rejected as a basis for an evaluative judgment. These assumptions imply the prediction that spontaneous and deliberate evaluations should be significantly correlated when the two kinds of information are consistent, however, spontaneous and deliberate evaluations should be unrelated when the two kinds of information are inconsistent (e.g., Gawronski et al, 2008a;Gawronski & Strack, 2004).…”

“…In contrast, verbal information about the target's ambition was expected to influence only deliberate, but not spontaneous evaluations (for related findings, see Edwards, 1990). Moreover, attractiveness-related, spontaneous evaluations were expected to provide a basis for deliberate evaluations only when spontaneous evaluations are consistent, but not when they are inconsistent with the propositional information about the target's ambition (see Gawronski et al, 2008a;Gawronski & Strack, 2004). As such, spontaneous and deliberate evaluations should be significantly correlated when the two kinds of information are consistent, but not when they are inconsistent.…”

“…To the degree that the affective response is consistent with other momentarily considered information, it may be regarded as valid, and therefore serve as a basis for an evaluative judgment. If, however, the affective response is inconsistent with other momentarily considered information, it may be regarded as invalid, and therefore rejected as a basis for an evaluative judgment (e.g., Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008a;Gawronski & Strack, 2004) As a simple invalidation (or negation) of a spontaneous affective response does not necessarily deactivate the associations that have led to that response (e.g., Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006;Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008b; see also Gilbert, 1991), associative and propositional processes can sometimes result in divergent evaluative responses. Specifically, activated associations may continue to determine spontaneous affective responses even if a spontaneous affective response has been invalidated by propositional processes.…”

When linking is stronger than thinking: Associative transfer of valence disrupts the emergence of cognitive balance after attitude change

“…In line with this contention, Gawronski et al (2009) argued that spreading activation may often lead to outcomes that are in line with the principles of cognitive consistency (e.g., Greenwald et al, 2002), even though the two are guided by different operating principles (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006;Strack & Deutsch, 2004). However, as the application of consistency principles can promote a rejection of momentarily activated information under certain conditions (e.g., Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008;Gawronski & Strack, 2004), spreading activation and cognitive consistency principles may sometimes lead to different outcomes. This notion is also reflected in the present results, in which simple processes of spreading activation (i.e., associative transfer of valence) disrupted the emergence of balanced attitudes.…”