Understanding the Intensity of UK Policy Commitments to Nuclear Power

Policy mixes for incumbency: Exploring the destructive recreation of renewable energy, shale gas ‘fracking,’ and nuclear power in the United Kingdom

“…A final relevant theme of research deals with "deep incumbency'" (Johnstone & Stirling 2015a;Cox et al 2016). Building on insights in organisation theory (Tushman et al 1985), practice theory (Shove 2003), multilevel governance (Brondizio et al 2008), political economy (North 2006b) The central point, is that incumbency is not necessarily as neatly scaled and bounded as required in expedient ambitions to substitute one 'sociotechnical regime' for another.…”

“…Picking up on these kinds of challenge, this work on 'deep incumbency' explores a series of notions in political science and international relations, relating to concepts of incumbency whose implications span entire polities, rather than being confined to specific sectors (Johnstone & Stirling 2015a;Cox et al 2016). These are variously-styled as 'deep structures' (Grover & Peschek 2014), 'dual states' (Fraenkel 2010), 'double government' (Glennon 2015) and (notably around nuclear power) 'subgovernment' (Temples 1980).…”

Positioning Nuclear Power in the Low-Carbon Electricity Transition

“…It requires extensive investigation to clarify the underwater part of the iceberg whose visible part hails nuclear power as a valid future low-carbon option. Cox, Johnstone and Stirling [31] add a 'deep incumbency' hypothesis to the more common explanations of conglomerated nuclear interests for investigating the 'apparent anomaly' of the 'unusual intensity and persistence of official UK policy commitments to civil nuclear power'. Secrecy rules obstruct independent research about the linkages between civil and military applications of nuclear technology.…”

“…The UK's record on civil nuclear projects is far from successful, but nuclear is ingrained into the fabric of the state itself. This may be due to the correlation of nuclear power plant construction with a desired nuclear weapons status, in the UK based on submarines with nuclear propulsion [31].…”

Lessons of Fukushima: Nine reasons why

“…Why did May decide to go ahead? A University of Sussex study tested a variety of possible explanations, and concluded that, despite the serious reservations, the British prime minister approved the project principally to sustain Britain's nuclear deterrent capability by keeping the nuclear power industry in the UK up to such a level as to support the construction of new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines intended to replace the existing Vanguard-class submarines (Cox, Johnstone, and Stirling 2016).…”