Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange

Williamson, Oliver E.; Wachter, Michael L.; Harris, Jeffrey E.

doi:10.2307/3003224

Cited by 514 publications

(117 citation statements)

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“…Recently, Kaufman (2004), Bryson et al (2005) and Hirsch (2007) have echoed Streeck (1992) in arguing that theorization of union effects should emphasize governance. Streeck's (1992) argument is influenced by Williamson et al (1975) inference that unions may render employers' commitments to employees more credible and, in particular, provide effective governance over the deferred claims embodied in the ILM. This does provide a starting point for a more abstract interpretation of the present findings.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Meanwhile, while enterprise unions may appear the ideal complement to ILMs (e.g. Williamson 1991), their vulnerability to local opportunism may not only threaten their significance (1991: 88) but actually neutralize their benefits. Moreover, Marsden (1999) shows that despite Williamson's (1991) presumption that ILMs develop autonomously within firms' boundaries, they not only display distinct national characters but are actively supported by interfirm institutions elaborating, legitimating and enforcing broad principles in the design and classification of jobs.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Williamson 1991), their vulnerability to local opportunism may not only threaten their significance (1991: 88) but actually neutralize their benefits. Moreover, Marsden (1999) shows that despite Williamson's (1991) presumption that ILMs develop autonomously within firms' boundaries, they not only display distinct national characters but are actively supported by interfirm institutions elaborating, legitimating and enforcing broad principles in the design and classification of jobs. International evidence on pay structures (Lazear and Shaw 2008) confirms that in countries of industrial unionism, consistent systems of job classification are available, and that where industrial unions are stronger, there tends to be a more intricate and secure linkage of pay to the categories of job classifications.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Where Do Unions Add Value? Predominant Organizing Principle, Union Strength and Manufacturing Productivity Growth in the OECD

Vernon¹,

Rogers²

2012

Brit J Industrial Rel

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This article deploys comparative historical data on 14 OECD countries to examine the significance of predominant union structure for the impact of union strength on the (medium‐term) growth in hourly labour productivity in manufacturing. The analysis shows that where craft and general unionism predominates, union strength has a deleterious impact on productivity growth. Where enterprise unionism predominates, union strength is irrelevant. However, where industrial unionism predominates, union strength promotes productivity growth. These effects exist independently of established economic influences on aggregate productivity growth. The findings are interpreted as displaying the importance of the character of the governance that unions provide for their productivity impact.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Where Do Unions Add Value? Predominant Organizing Principle, Union Strength and Manufacturing Productivity Growth in the OECD

Vernon¹,

Rogers²

2012

Brit J Industrial Rel

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“…In detail, the owners of firms usually delegate most daily operations, such as employee recruiting, to management [1] [2], which makes the principal & agent problem inevitable. The uncertainty of the market condition makes the output volatile; therefore, the owner can't attribute the output level merely to the manager's merit or effort.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Worker Recruiting with Favoritism and Bribery

Chen

Tang²

2015

TEL

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This paper discusses the corruptive action widespread in the organizations' worker recruiting: favoritism and bribery. The managers of the firm are actually able to discern the type of the productivity of the job-seekers, but they utilize the information advantage through the two types of misconduct-favoritism and bribery, at the expense of the profit share of the principal (the owner) and the workers' wage rent. The key conclusion is drawn from this paper as follows: neither the intensity of favoritism nor the wage level matters in determining whether there's profit or loss in the firm, whereas the key variable is the relative situation of exterior labor market.

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“…The concept was further developed by a number of institutionalist labour economists in the US during the 1970s and 1980s, in particular Peter Doeringer, Michael Piore and Paul Osterman (Doeringer and Piore, 1971;Osterman, 1984Osterman, , 1987Osterman, and 1994Osterman and Burton, 2005;Piore, 2002). In addition, a number of economists working in the more mainstream fields of new institutional economics (Baker et al, 1994a and b;Wachter and Wright, 1990;Williamson et al, 1975) and personnel economics (Lazear, 1992;Lazear and Oyer, 2004) have made important contributions to the study of ILMs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Skill Level and the Returns to Job-Tenure in Internal Labour Markets in Australia

Dobbie¹,

MacMillan²

2011

ASS

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Both the enterprise and salaried versions of the internal labour market model predict an important role for job specific tenure in the determination of employee earnings. This paper estimates earnings equations using data drawn from the 2005 wave of the Survey of Education and Training Experience (hereafter SETE) to test this idea. The paper finds considerable support for the presence of a job tenure effect, even after controlling for general labour market experience. The paper also seeks to determine if the strength of the tenure effect is related to skill level. The paper finds that the evidence for a tenure effect is strong across the broad spectrum of skill levels, except for the least skilled workers, where the job tenure earnings profile is noticeably flatter. This in turn suggests that internal labour markets have broad relevance across the whole of the skill spectrum, but with somewhat less importance for the least skilled workers.

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Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange

Cited by 514 publications

References 0 publications

Where Do Unions Add Value? Predominant Organizing Principle, Union Strength and Manufacturing Productivity Growth in the OECD

Where Do Unions Add Value? Predominant Organizing Principle, Union Strength and Manufacturing Productivity Growth in the OECD

Worker Recruiting with Favoritism and Bribery

Skill Level and the Returns to Job-Tenure in Internal Labour Markets in Australia

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