Understanding the Dutch “No”: The Euro, the East, and the
                                Elite

Aarts, Kees; Kolk, Hendrik van der

doi:10.1017/s1049096506060434

Cited by 63 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…This rise in Dutch euroscepticism ultimately contributed to the Dutch 'no' to the European Constitution in the 2005 referendum (Aarts and Van der Kolk, 2006;De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005;Lubbers, 2008). The Netherlands had earlier been one of the least Eurosceptic countries (Norris, 1999;Thomassen, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A longitudinal study of euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 versus 1990

Lubbers

Jaspers

2011

European Union Politics

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With a unique longitudinal data set covering a time-span of 18 years, we test to what extent euroscepticism evolved among the Dutch between 1990 and 2008. We compare Eurosceptic attitudes on the eve of the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht with attitudes after the Dutch 'no' in the referendum on the European Constitution. We find a strong increase in euroscepticism among the Dutch. This change did not develop evenly across the educational strata. We propose to explain these differences through the utilitarian, political cueing, political cynicism and identity approaches. Over the years, the less educated have become more cynical about politics and have come to perceive a greater ethnic threat than before, which explains their stronger increase in euroscepticism. In contrast to 1990, perceived ethnic threat was the main predictor of euroscepticism in 2008.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A longitudinal study of euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 versus 1990

Lubbers

Jaspers

2011

European Union Politics

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“…The Netherlands was one of the first countries in Western Europe to do so. The debates and also voting behavior reflected broadly shared concerns about the decline of the Dutch culture (Buruma 2006;Aarts and Van der Kolk 2006;Lechner 2008). That may also hold for the 1,648% rise in the number of Muslims in the Netherlands between 1970 (54,000) and 2006 (944,000) (Becker and De Hart 2006).…”

Section: Tracing the Mechanisms: Case Selection And Data Collectionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Re-emerging Christianity in West European Politics: The Case of the Netherlands

Vollaard

2013

Politics and Religion

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Does Christianity re-emerge in politics even in the most secularized part of the world, Western Europe? In this article, the exemplary case of the Netherlands provides empirical evidence for two mechanisms of resurgent Christianity in party politics. In this way, the article also offers a more precise understanding under what conditions various dimensions of religion become (again) or remain politically significant. The first mechanism has been the incentive of secularization and secularism for remaining Christians to regroup in a so-called creative minority to convey an explicitly faith-based message to a broader public. Modernization has therefore not automatically meant less religion in politics. However, creative minorities remained a relatively minor affair in Dutch party politics, despite the large number of Christian migrants and their descendants. Second, Christian and culturally rightwing, secular parties have increasingly referred to a Judeo-Christian culture to mark the political identities of the European Union and its nations in response to Islam's growing visibility. The concept of Judeo-Christian culture foremost functioned as a sacred word to denote the liberal and secular order of the West, reflecting the re-emergence of Christianity as cultural phenomenon rather than faith in West European politics.

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“…The content of elite criticism varied on the right and on the left, but political elites were similarly divided and the lack of a coherent message was also striking (Harmsen, 2008). So even if the precise motivations and chronology of events differed (Aarts and van der Kolk, 2006;Binnema and Crum, 2007), the Dutch case also highlights difficulty parties face when dealing with the EU in national politics.…”

Section: Conclusion: Beyond the French Casementioning

confidence: 99%

The French debate over the Bolkestein directive

Grossman

Woll

2011

Comp Eur Polit

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Why did the services directive proposed by Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein lead to such virulent reactions in France? This article examines several potential explanations focusing on political economy, public opinion and the timing of events. While all of these elements contribute to the difficult political context, they are insufficient to explain the importance of the backlash against the directive in France. We therefore focus on party politics and argue that political elites had an interest in exploiting the directive in the context of a leadership crisis within the French socialist party. The case study bears lessons about the domestic potency of European policy issues: they can pose a real challenge to centrist parties, which have insufficiently addressed them in their party platforms.

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Understanding the Dutch “No”: The Euro, the East, and the Elite

Cited by 63 publications

References 2 publications

A longitudinal study of euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 versus 1990

A longitudinal study of euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 versus 1990

Re-emerging Christianity in West European Politics: The Case of the Netherlands

The French debate over the Bolkestein directive

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