Understanding the Divergent Logics of Landlords: Circumstantial versus Deliberate Pathways

Abstract

Landlords are important gatekeepers in the rental market, and scholars have studied landlord perceptions across different markets. But differences between landlord logics within a market, which drive landlord behaviors, have been largely unexamined. Drawing chiefly on 30 in-depth landlord interviews and 20 observations with property managers in Philadelphia, I argue that landlords exhibit a range of logics. When faced with rental market decisions, some employ profit-maximizing criteria, whereas others consider social closeness with tenants or the meanings of properties. These differences relate to pathways into property ownership: landlords who obtain property circumstantially focus on profit maximization less than those who purchase property deliberately to pursue profits. This paper extends our understanding of landlords, connecting their pathways to a range of logics within a single market context. It also suggests that policies should consider the logics of landlords they seek to influence.

Predatory Inclusion in the Market for Rental Housing: A Multicity Empirical Test

“… 3 Landlords are, of course, not monolithic. They range in their motives for property ownership, the number of units owned, and the amount of investment they put into their properties (Shiffer-Sebba 2020). …”

Neighborhoods of last resort: How landlord strategies concentrate violent crime

“…First, landlords’ screening practices determine who lives in their properties (Madensen & Eck, 2012; Mazerolle et al., 1998). Landlords vary considerably in the extent to which they screen potential tenants (Rosen et al., 2021; Shiffer‐Sebba, 2020), and those who overlook tenants’ employment histories or criminal records, for example, contribute to the hyperconcentration (that is, in specific buildings) of people who routinely engage in behavior that risks violence (e.g., participation in the underground economy and involvement in criminal networks). Eck (1994) and Aalbers (2006) described how some landlords turn a blind eye to potential drug dealing at their properties if tenants pay rent.…”

“…Although limited tenant screening, property neglect, and frequent use of eviction are distinct practices, landlords who frequently enact all three may be said to have adopted a “low‐end property management strategy.” These practices not only incentivize one another—as when frequent tenant turnover increases property deterioration—they also correspond to different management goals. Landlords who want to profit from property value appreciation (Mallach, 2014) or have a sentimental attachment to a building (Shiffer‐Sebba, 2020) will likely follow a high‐end management strategy, whereas landlords who want to reap whatever profits they can, with minimal investment of time or money, will not. Together, the above considerations motivate our first hypothesis.…”

The Costs of Seeking Shelter for Renters With Discrediting Background Records

“… 6 Though most landlords use some form of commercial background screening data to evaluate applicants, recent research suggests there is wide variation in the technological sophistication and formalization of tenant screening practices. Some independent landlords still use rather informal evaluation methods, supplementing information from rental applications and/or background screening reports with their own subjective or “gut” judgments (Reosti 2020; Greif 2018; Shiffer-Sebba 2020), while others outsource decision making completely to tenant screening firms who provide a rent/do-not rent recommendation on the basis of a numerical score (Dunn and Grabchuk 2010). Meanwhile some larger firms—particularly the new class of financial firms turned-landlords (Fields 2014)—employ sophisticated algorithmic or artificial intelligence (AI) scoring technologies to screen and select tenants without any in-person contact (Fields 2019; Kirchner and Goldstein 2020).…”