Understanding the black box of communication in a common-pool resource field experiment

Abstract

It is well proven that communication enhances cooperation in public goods and commonpool resource experiments. It is less well understood why and how communication affects cooperative behavior and whether that impact is mediated by the sharing of a common context and the individuals' every day experiences. This paper aims to close this gap by means of a systematic content analysis of communication transcripts from field experiments. The paper analyzes communication statements shared by participants in a series of common-pool resource experiments conducted in rural Colombia. We first classified each statement under two categories: topic and function. Then, we tested hypotheses about the impact of those statements on cooperation depending on (1) their reference to the "field context" and other topic categories; and (2) the "informational", "disapproval", or "group solidarity" function of the statements. According to our results, statements that contain references to the context affect cooperation depending on the function of those statements. When the statements fulfill an information role, the effect is negative, but when statements have the function of enhancing group solidarity, the effect is positive. The statements that have the strongest positive impact on cooperation are those fulfilling a disapproval function, particularly when the topic of the messages are the payoffs obtained by the group.

Group Communication During Resource Dilemmas: 4: The Effect of Group Size

“…In fact, members of her research group have performed experimental simulations analogous to this study. Among the many examples, Lopez and Villamayor‐Tomas (n.d.) used a revised version of the coding scheme applied here in an examination of discussion content from groups of rural Columbians engaging in a forest preservation simulation relevant to their real lives.…”

Structuring Communication Effectively for Environmental Cooperation

“…Brandts et al (2016) report that 42 to 50 percent of the group leaders in their experiment sent at least once a message to their group with "content of comprehension" like an "[o]bservation of decline" (p. 812) of the cooperation rate or "[o]bservations of followers undercutting" (p. 812). Finally, Lopez and Villamayor-Tomas (2017) categorise 45 percent of the total of 1,493 messages recorded to the two information categories "Game dynamics" and "Past result and actions", with the former taking into account descriptions of free riding or " [s]tatements describing the dilemma between individual appropriation and group gains" (p.…”

“…In order to overcome the identified problem, participants subsequently communicated about how to address the social dilemma, i.e., they identified strategies. Lopez and Villamayor-Tomas (2017) assign 22 percent of their messages to the category "Collective strategy" or "Individualistic (Koukoumelis, Levati, & Weisser, 2012) formed a very similar category "Payoff calculation: Calculation of the (period or overall) payoff associated with the proposal." (p. 386) and found that 67 to 78 percent of the team leaders in their experiment sent at least once a message containing such a calculation to their fellow team members.…”

“…This observation is particularly interesting when one takes into account that the studies employed different designs and framings. Koukoumelis et al (2012) and Brandts et al (2016), for example, allowed only one actor, the leader, to communicate via written messages in a public good game, whereas in Pavitt et al (2005) and in Lopez and Villamayor-Tomas (2017) all group members in the associated common pool resource game could communicate and did so face-to-face. Furthermore, the studies were conducted in culturally different locations and used different categorization and coding schemes.…”

Design trade‐offs in rights‐based management of small‐scale fisheries

“…This leads to greater incentives to free ride and diminishes the capacity of users to enforce regulations and punish defectors (Ostrom ). Second, as group size increases, the capacity to devise appropriate and legitimate management rules diminishes (Olson ) because larger groups tend to have greater heterogeneity of users (social, cultural, economic) (Poteete & Ostrom ) and diminished communication opportunities (Lopez & Villamayor‐Tomas ). Overall, increases in TURF size create larger groups, which accentuate challenges for collective action and may dwarf the capacity of self‐organizing systems to achieve optimal outcomes.…”