2016
DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620160000019011
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Understanding Social Impact Bonds and Their Alternatives: An Experimental Investigation

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Research also needs to focus on the development of a complete theory of SIBs. Only Wong et al (); Giacomantonio (); and Pauly and Swanson's () studies can be considered pure theoretical contributions, as they demonstrated the circumstances under which SIBs could outperform alternative contracts and the key issues that should be considered to develop a solid theory about SIBs. First, the uniqueness of investors' participation in SIBs has to be investigated.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Research also needs to focus on the development of a complete theory of SIBs. Only Wong et al (); Giacomantonio (); and Pauly and Swanson's () studies can be considered pure theoretical contributions, as they demonstrated the circumstances under which SIBs could outperform alternative contracts and the key issues that should be considered to develop a solid theory about SIBs. First, the uniqueness of investors' participation in SIBs has to be investigated.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With the aim of understanding why SIBs exist, all these contributions compared SIBs with alternative funding schemes and defined under which conditions SIBs add value to involved stakeholders. Wong et al () aimed at elucidating the role of specific contract incentives in the exacerbation or mitigation of underperformance typically affecting not‐for‐profit actors. Using a principal–agent framework, they theoretically and experimentally compared SIBs with input‐based and performance‐based (PB) contracts.…”
Section: Analysis Of the Content Of The Contributionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, private investors are interested to overstate project risks in order to negotiate a higher share of profits from the commissioner. On the contrary, the government and the organization performing the service may have the interest to show that the project is feasible and private financing is profitable (Wong et al., 2016). As for the previous case, an audit of a third independent party of risks and returns of the project can overcome these problems.…”
Section: Potential Conflicts Of Interest Under An Asymmetric Informat...mentioning
confidence: 99%