Understanding shame:Examining how justice and emotions operate in the context of restorative justice

Abstract

An essential element of the restorative justice process is engagement in emotional healing, which is made possible via the ways in which offenders manage shame. Effective shame management depends in part on the operation of justice principles. While research has examined justice and the importance of emotions in facilitating the restorative justice process, further investigation is necessary to understand how various types of justice affect emotions and facilitate the restoration of offenders. This article provides an overview of major findings regarding the relationship between justice, attributions, and emotions and how these findings relate to restorative justice. Implications for research in restorative justice are also discussed.

Public Caning: Should it Be Maintained or Eliminated? (A Reflection of Implementation Sharia Law in Indonesia)

“…Most of the punitive punishment covered by those bylaws have only consisted of cunning and imprisonment, without considering social working as a punishment. In contrast, some Muslim countries have implemented restorative justice as a part of the punishment (Gade, 2018;Moss et al, 2018;Scheuerman, 2018). Restorative justice has recognized publicly as a method of the justice system to form a conciliation between the victim and the offender.…”

Moral work in victim–offender meetings

“…Of course, much research and writing on restorative justice recognises a moral significance in its ideals and practices and most scholars would recognise the same irony that we see in Esther's introduction to the meetings. For example, the early and influential work by Braithwaite (1989) drew its operational energy from shaming, one of the classic 'moral emotions', and has stimulated considerable discussion about the relative importance of shame vis-à-vis other emotions such as guilt, remorse or empathy in transforming the offender's perspective on the offence (Doak, 2011;Scheuerman, 2018;Van Stokkom, 2002). Another line of work pays much attention to the apologies made by offenders and forgiveness extended by victims (Doak, 2011;Hayes, 2006;Szmania and Mangis, 2005), which are easily classed, but not necessarily well understood (Gill, 2000;Van Stokkom, 2008), as moral actions.…”