Abstract:Affordances are possibilities for action offered by the environment. Recent research on affordances holds that there are differences in how people experience such possibilities for action. However, these differences have not been properly investigated. In this paper I start by briefly scrutinizing the existing literature on this issue, and then argue for two claims. First, that whether an affordance solicits action or not depends on its relevance to the agent's concerns. Second, that the experiential character… Show more
“…In Dings (2018Dings ( , 2019 I developed the idea of narrative self -programming which entails that, during moments of narrative deliberation, one tries to make oneself responsive to certain possibilities for action. On this view, abstract long-term intentions (e.g.…”
Section: Personal Characteristics Of Agency: Diachronic Self-interprmentioning
It has been argued that affordances are not meaningful and are thus not useful to be applied in contexts where specifically meaningfulness of experience is at stake (e.g. clinical contexts or discussions of autonomous agency). This paper aims to reconceptualize affordances such as to make them relevant and applicable in such contexts. It starts by investigating the ‘ambiguity’ of (possibilities for) action. In both philosophy of action and affordance research, this ambiguity is typically resolved by adhering to the agents intentions and concerns. I discuss some recent accounts of affordances that highlight these concerns but argue that they tend to adopt an ‘atomistic’ approach where there is no acknowledgement of how these concerns are embedded in the agents wider concerns, values, projects and commitments. An holistic approach that does acknowledge this can be found in psychological research on agents having a sense of what they’re doing. I will discuss this research in the second part of the paper and argue that agents can analogously have a sense of what is afforded. This is deemed the entry point for understanding the meaningfulness of affordances. In the final part of the paper I apply this analysis to recent attempts which seek to make sense of authentic and autonomous agency in terms of affordances.
“…In Dings (2018Dings ( , 2019 I developed the idea of narrative self -programming which entails that, during moments of narrative deliberation, one tries to make oneself responsive to certain possibilities for action. On this view, abstract long-term intentions (e.g.…”
Section: Personal Characteristics Of Agency: Diachronic Self-interprmentioning
It has been argued that affordances are not meaningful and are thus not useful to be applied in contexts where specifically meaningfulness of experience is at stake (e.g. clinical contexts or discussions of autonomous agency). This paper aims to reconceptualize affordances such as to make them relevant and applicable in such contexts. It starts by investigating the ‘ambiguity’ of (possibilities for) action. In both philosophy of action and affordance research, this ambiguity is typically resolved by adhering to the agents intentions and concerns. I discuss some recent accounts of affordances that highlight these concerns but argue that they tend to adopt an ‘atomistic’ approach where there is no acknowledgement of how these concerns are embedded in the agents wider concerns, values, projects and commitments. An holistic approach that does acknowledge this can be found in psychological research on agents having a sense of what they’re doing. I will discuss this research in the second part of the paper and argue that agents can analogously have a sense of what is afforded. This is deemed the entry point for understanding the meaningfulness of affordances. In the final part of the paper I apply this analysis to recent attempts which seek to make sense of authentic and autonomous agency in terms of affordances.
“…He claims that the notion of affordance is too coarse-grained to capture the different ways in which a situation can appear meaningful to an individual ( Ratcliffe 2015 , 61; c.f. Dings 2018 ; Ratcliffe and Broome, forthcoming ). A situation can be exciting or boring, comforting in its familiarity or disturbing in its strangeness.…”
In this article, we propose a neurophenomenological account of what moods are, and how they work. We draw upon phenomenology to show how mood attunes a person to a space of significant possibilities. Mood structures a person’s lived experience by fixing the kinds of significance the world can have for them in a given situation. We employ Karl Friston’s free-energy principle to show how this phenomenological concept of mood can be smoothly integrated with cognitive neuroscience. We will argue that mood is a consequence of acting in the world with the aim of minimizing expected free energy—a measure of uncertainty about the future consequences of actions. Moods summarize how the organism is faring overall in its predictive engagements, tuning the organism’s expectations about how it is likely to fare in the future. Agents that act to minimize expected free energy will have a feeling of how well or badly they are doing at maintaining grip on the multiple possibilities that matter to them. They will have what we will call a ‘feeling of grip’ that structures the possibilities they are ready to engage with over long time-scales, just as moods do.
“…Thus, whereas valence-based constructs serve to account for the subjective underpinnings of perceptual experience (e.g., affective states), affordance only refers to an invariant combination of factors that allows the agent to manipulate her environment despite the variability of the flux of perceptual stimuli (Gibson, 1979 ). This focus on invariants might be one of the reasons why philosophical research started to study the subjective (e.g., affective) dimension of affordances only in recent years (Rietveld, 2008 ; Gallagher, 2017 ; Dings, 2018 ; Krueger and Colombetti, 2018 ).…”
Section: The Subjective Dimension Of Affordancesmentioning
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