Understanding (non)involvement in terrorist violence: What sets extremists who use terrorist violence apart from those who do not?

Abstract

Research summaryWe compare European and North American radicalization trajectories that led to involvement in terrorist violence (n = 103) with those for which this outcome did not occur (n = 103). Regression analyses illustrate how involvement in terrorist violence is determined not only by the presence of risk, but also the absence of protective factors. Bivariate analyses highlight the importance of considering the temporality of these factors; i.e., whether they are present before or after radicalization onset. The most salient risk factors identified were alignment with a group or movement with an exclusively violent strategic logic, and access to weapons. In terms of protective factors, parenting children during radicalization, self‐control, and participation in extremist groups with a strategic logic that was not exclusively focused on violent means were all associated with noninvolvement in terrorist violence.Policy implicationsDifferent patterns of risk and protective factors influence whether radicalization will, or will not, lead to involvement in terrorist violence. One‐size‐fits‐all radicalization‐prevention efforts may therefore be less effective than programs tailored to address a particular outcome. Even when terrorist violence is prevented, the targeted individual is likely to remain radicalized. Preventative efforts must carefully assess whether the measures used to avert terrorist violence in the short‐term risk contributing to a longer term societal threat. The efficacy of preventative efforts depends in part on when they are deployed, that is, before or after radicalization onset.

Contextualizing involvement in terrorist violence by considering non-significant findings: Using null results and temporal perspectives to better understand radicalization outcomes

“…The existing literature suggests that radicalizing individuals who maintain prosocial interpersonal ties, or retain viewpoint diversity in their social networks, appear less likely to endorse or engage in terrorist violence [138,204,205]. While we found viewpoint diversity as such to fall (just) outside of statistical significance (both before and after radicalization onset), we did find a strong association between maintaining or increasing such diversity after radicalization and a lower likelihood of turning to terrorism [83]. This offers another example of the relevance of exploring such variables in a dynamic fashion that can account for change over time, rather than as static constructs that are either present or absent.…”

“…Scholars have long been interested in whether terrorism is a product of mental illness [89]. While we detail our statistically significant findings related to sub-clinical and professionallydiagnosed mental illnesses elsewhere [83], here we report that we did not find neurodevelopmental issues (i.e., conditions such as attention-deficit disorder that are distinct from mental illnesses) to be associated with radicalization leading to terrorist violence. These findings support a broader skeptical position on the extent to which clinical diagnoses confer risk of involvement in terrorist violence [24].…”

“…However, when they do, such behavioral radicalization can include a range of both legal and illegal activities beyond terrorist violence, such as spreading propaganda, raising funds, recruiting new members, or vying for political power through democratic means [79][80][81]. In other words, although radicalization has become almost synonymous with terrorism, radicalized behavior can take a variety of forms, including both essentially legal and non-violent activism, as well as clearly illegal political violence [82,83].…”

“…In other words, it has long been clear that radicalizing influences, regardless of whether they reside at the structural, group or movement, or individual level of analysis, do not produce uniform results among people exposed to them. Recent years have also seen scholars increasingly try to differentiate between various forms of radicalization process outcomes (e.g., violent versus non-violent) [57,83,84,99,120,137,138], as well as specific attempts to better understand why radicalizing individuals may not turn to violence [139][140][141]. Clearly, some ground has already been covered on the question of why (a particular form of) radicalization does not occur, bringing with it a better sense of the contexts in which theories for involvement in terrorism do, and do not, apply.…”