Understanding intentions from actions: Direct perception, inference, and the roles of mirror and mentalizing systems

Abstract

This review asks whether observers can obtain information about others' intentions from observation of their actions; and if so, whether this process is performed using direct perceptual or inferential processes (prominent examples of each being the intention understanding theory of mirror neuron function, and mentalizing accounts of intention understanding, respectively). I propose four conditions that should be fulfilled in order to support a direct perception account, and suggest that only two of these conditions are supported by the existing data. I then propose and review three further sources of evidence which have the potential to inform this debate, concluding that the data do not support the direct perception account. In particular, mirror neurons may be involved in lower--level processes of action perception, but there is no evidence to support their involvement in the type of higher--level intention understanding that is proposed by the direct perception account.

Avoidant Responses to Interpersonal Provocation Are Associated with Increased Amygdala and Decreased Mentalizing Network Activity

“…Mirror neurons are thought to be involved in automatic action perception, whereas mentalizing regions contribute to the more complex understanding of others’ cognitive and emotional state (Yang et al, 2015). Although some authors argue that these processes are independent (Catmur, 2015), others construe mirror activity as necessary for higher-level mentalizing inferences (Tidoni and Candidi, 2016). Our data suggests that both systems have a convergent role in deciding how individuals respond to provocation.…”

Dissociated Representations of Deceptive Intentions and Kinematic Adaptations in the Observer's Motor System

“…However, it is also possible that high-level processes involving mentalizing system areas (i.e., medial prefrontal cortex but also the temporal-parietal junction and posterior cingulate cortex) might mediate the intentional modulation of motor resonance (e.g., Catmur 2015).…”

“…Indeed, by observing "how" an action is performed, we try to understand "why" the actor is performing that action, for example, if the actor wants to eat a grasped apple or to place it away (i.e., intention inference). It is well established that different covert intentions lead to overt differences in others' movements (Becchio et al 2010;Naish et al 2013;Ansuini et al 2015) and observers are able to pick-up and use these differences to infer the underlying intention (Manera et al 2011;Sartori et al 2011;see Ansuini et al 2015 andCatmur 2015 for a review). Even if in most cases we expect to deal with genuine intentions, interpersonal interactions may require to rely on action observation to understand whether a person is honest or deceitful through careful assessment of the available non-verbal cues (Runeson and Frykholm 1983;Ekman and O'Sullivan 1991;Sebanz and Schiffrar 2009).…”

Neural processing of social interaction: Coordinate‐based meta‐analytic evidence from human neuroimaging studies

“…However, this segregation conflicts with their joint activation when processing social interactions , regardless of stimuli type (Arioli et al, ; Centelles, Assaiante, Nazarian, Anton, & Schmitz, ; Iacoboni et al, ; Kujala, Carlson, & Hari, ). Their concurrent engagement might reflect the greater complexity of understanding interactions, which, compared with individual actions, would require both the recognition of joint actions, and a representation of their multiple actors' mental states (Catmur, ). We have recently shown that the relative activation and connectivity pattern of the action observation and mentalizing networks indeed depend on different dimensions expressed by interactions, such as their degree of cooperativity and affectivity, respectively (Arioli, Perani, et al, ; Canessa et al, ; Proverbio et al, ).…”