This article provides replies to, and comments on, the contributions to the special issue on the philosophy of information. It seeks to highlight convergences and points of potential agreement, while offering clarifications and further details. It also answers some criticisms and replies to some objections articulated in the special issue. This is a collection of very fine essays. Their scope, depth, and insightfulness are testimonies not only to the brilliance and scholarship of their authors but also to the remarkable maturity reached by the philosophy of information (PI) during the past decade. In the late 1990s, I was searching for an approach to some key philosophical questions: the nature of knowledge, the structure of reality, the uniqueness of human consciousness, a satisfactory way of dealing with the new ethical challenges posed by information and communication technologies, to list some of the topics discussed in this collection. I had in mind a way of doing philosophy that could be rigorous, rational, and conversant with our scientific knowledge, in line with the best examples set by the analytic tradition; non-psychologistic, in a Fregean sense; capable of dealing with contemporary and lively issues about which we really care; and less prone to metaphysical armchair speculations and idiosyncratic intuitions. I was looking for a constructive philosophy that would provide answers, not just analyses, that would be as free as possible from a self-indulgent, anthropocentric obsession with us and our super-duper role in the whole universe, and respectfully sceptical of commonsensical introspections and Indo-European linguistic biases. It was a recipe for disaster, but then, sometimes, fortune favours the irresponsible. During that period of intellectual struggle and confusion, I realised one day that what I had in mind was really quite simple: a philosophy grounded on the concept of information. I was not on my way to Damascus but in Oxford, at Wolfson College, sitting on the bank of the river Cherwell, when I r