Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility Through Experiments

Abstract

Abstract:Corruption and corruptibility -due to their illegal and therefore secretive nature -are difficult to be assessed either with traditional tools, such as hard data on criminal convictions or soft data elicited through opinion polls, questionnaires, or case studies. While there seems to be agreement nowadays that corruption does have a negative impact on (foreign) private investment and growth, government revenue and infrastructure, and social equality, and while there seems to be evidence that low economic development, federal structure and short histories of experience with democracy and free trade all favour corruption on the macro-level, it is poorly understood what exactly, on the micro-level, the determinants of corruptibility are and what institutional arrangements could be used to fight (the causes of) corruption. In this article we review a third, complementary mode of investigation of corruption and corruptibility: experiments. We assess their strengths and weaknesses, and identify areas where they could be particularly useful in guiding policy choices -namely in designing incentive-compatible and effective anti-corruption measures in public procurement.

Análisis experimental de la corrupción y de las medidas anticorrupción. ¿Dónde estamos, hacia dónde vamos?

“…Como respuesta a esto, Abbink et al (2002) encontraron que el ser consciente de la externalidad negativa que genera la corrupción y saber a quién afecta no tiene efectos sobre la decisión de ofrecer o aceptar un soborno. Dado este resultado, queda una duda acerca de la efectividad que puedan tener las campañas que resaltan los costos de la corrupción, una medida común en la práctica, por lo que este dinero se podría invertir de manera más eficiente (Dusek et al, 2005). Este resultado desalentador se confirma en Büchner et al (2008), quienes encuentran que ser consciente de que la corrupción es perjudicial para la sociedad no ayuda.…”

“…En la literatura de economía experimental ya existen algunas revisiones de literatura sobre experimentos en corrupción (Andvig, 2005;Dusek, Ortmann y Lízal, 2005;Abbink, 2006;Bobkova y Egbert, 2012;Frank et al, 2011;Serra y Wantchekon, 2012). No existe en cambio una recopilación similar desde las otras disciplinas relevantes.…”

Estudios experimentales sobre corrupción y el problema de la validez externa

“…Así, se han utilizado variantes del juego de confianza (trust game) para modelar el ofrecimiento de coimas y variantes del juego del dictador (dictator game) para modelar la malversación de fondos (véase un compendio detallado de resultados experimentales en Abbink, 2006;Dusek, Ortmann & Lizal, 2005). Este trabajo se centra en el fenómeno de ofrecimiento y aceptación de coimas, ya que es el más estudiado.…”

Fighting Greed with Money: How Wage Levels Impact Corruption in the Private Purchasing Sector

“…However, while there seems to be evidence on what favours corruption on a macro-level, at a micro-level, there is not as much understanding as to what the contributing factors for corruption are (Dusek, Ortmann, and Lízal 2005). Furthermore, as corruption is generally a secretive and often illegal topic, it is quite difficult to measure, whether with hard or soft data (OrtizOspina and Roser 2016).…”

“…However, experiments on corruption and corruptibility, which seem a very fitting approach to finding causes and solutions (Dusek, Ortmann, and Lízal 2005), are few and far between. This resulted in the choice of conducting an experiment in the current research.…”