Understanding Cooperative Advertising Participation Rates in Conventional Channels

Bergen, Mark; John, George

doi:10.2307/3151898

Cited by 108 publications

(30 citation statements)

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“…In this paper, we capture the randomness in the market demand by the additive form. The additive demand uncertainty is widely used in the literature [15]- [18 ]. We thus model the demand for the product at the retailer, denoted by D(a, ε), as:…”

Section: Assumptions and The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Jiang¹

2018

IJAPM

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Abstract:The loss averse retailer sells the newsboy type of product to the consumers in a one-period two-echelon supply chain, where the risk neutral manufacturer supply the product to the retailer. When the market demand only depend on the retailer's advertising investment and is uncertain, this paper discusses the manufacturer's participation rate ,the retailer's advertising expenditures and order quantity decision problems in a Stackelberg game. After characterizing the equilibrium solution of this game, this paper show the effect of each parameter on optimal decisions. The results reveal that the loss averse retailer's optimal order quantity is less than the risk neutral retailer's optimal decision and decrease as the loss aversion level increases. Maybe it's the reason that the upstream manufacturer will share the advertising investment of the downstream retailer, the retailer's optimal local advertising expenditure is yet greater than the risk neutral retailer's optimal decision and is increasing in the loss aversion level. When the degree of loss aversion become larger ,the manufacturer's optimal participation rate first increases and then decreases until zero. The numerical example is given to analyze the effects of parameter on some optimal decisions and also confirm the relevant conclusion.

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Section: Assumptions and The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Jiang¹

2018

IJAPM

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“…These system-wide goals (e.g., to build and improve a national image for the brand) are usually accomplished through nationwide advertising campaigns. In this sense, it is necessary to distinguish between local advertising (promotional efforts with a short-term impact undertaken in a limited trading area) and national advertising (advertising efforts undertaken in the national market with a long-term impact) (Bergen andJohn 1997, Jørgensen et al 2000).…”

Section: Local Advertisingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Antecedents of early terminations in franchising: franchisor versus franchisee cancelations

López-Fernández

López‐Bayón

2017

Small Bus Econ

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Franchisors capitalize on franchisee entrepreneurial capacity to grow. However, enabling franchisees to develop their ventures may damage system consistency. This dilemma makes conflict particularly prevalent in the field of franchising. Nevertheless, prior research has reported an incomplete picture of factors leading to serious disagreement and premature termination in franchise partnerships. We address this gap, first, by adding the entrepreneurial autonomy of franchisees as a relevant but underexplored source of conflict and, second, by providing a more fine-grained analysis of franchisors' versus franchisees' drivers of termination. Specifically, we focus on the controversial issues of pricing and local advertising policies and analyze how expanding franchisees' entrepreneurial autonomy in these decision areas is related to contract terminations depending on who ended the relationship (the franchisor or a franchisee). The study also highlights less controversial requirements and conditions (e.g., upfront investments, franchisor experience …) that may reduce early terminations. Our empirical objectives are met by using survey data from a sample of franchisor companies. The results show how the performance outcomes of entrepreneurial autonomy differ depending on the decision area in which it is exercised. Results also throw light on the consequences of various critical franchise policies that may be masked if both types of termination (franchisors vs. franchisees) are considered together.

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“…Cooperative advertising is a promotional strategy in which the manufacturer (supplier) aims to influence performance of the retailer (reseller) through paying a portion of the advertising cost invested by retailer (Bergen & John, 1997). The co-op advertising can significantly boost the market demand and therefore enhance profitability of the overall SC (Xie & Neyret, 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of cooperative promotion efforts with competing retailers in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain

Johari¹,

Hosseini‐Motlagh²

2018

10.5267/j.uscm

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In this paper, the issue of cooperative (co-op) promotion efforts is addressed in a two-stage supply chain (SC). The investigated SC includes one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers facing different market demands. The customers' demand is affected by both advertising efforts of the manufacturer and two retailers. Moreover, the retailers compete with each other on local advertising investments within the market. In order to boost the retailers' advertising level, it is assumed that the manufacturer pays a ratio of the retailers' advertising expenditures. We propose four non-cooperative game scenarios and one cooperative game. Non-cooperative models are established through both Stackelberg and Nash game between two echelons. Moreover, both Cournot and Collusion behaviors are assumed to be followed by two retailers. We develop a promotion cost sharing contract to achieve the channel coordination. Under cooperation model, all SC members seek to reach the highest profit for the entire SC by considering the bargaining power of the SC participants. In each game scenario the optimal solution and unique equilibrium are determined. In addition, a comparison on the advertising level of all SC members along with the value of participation rate are provided. In addition, the feasibility of the cooperative game is discussed and resulted.

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Understanding Cooperative Advertising Participation Rates in Conventional Channels

Cited by 108 publications

References 0 publications

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Antecedents of early terminations in franchising: franchisor versus franchisee cancelations

Coordination of cooperative promotion efforts with competing retailers in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain

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