2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2010.07.002
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Understanding China's grain procurement policy from a perspective of optimization

Abstract: This paper develops an optimization model to analyze the policy formulation underChina's dual-track grain procurement system. By capturing the redistribution objective and the urban food security objective in a political preference function, we provide some rigorous explanations of three important aspects of China's grain policies: the choice of the dual-track procurement system over the lump-sum tax scheme as a means of extracting economic surpluses from the grain sector; the suppression of the procurement pr… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Therefore, bold policies and institutional reforms were implemented to motivate greater production by rural households (Fan et al 2004). In 1978 the government introduced the household responsibility system, under which key land rights were reallocated from collective farms to rural households and the households were required to sell the grain to the government with some specified quota amount at contract prices in exchange for use rights to specific plots of land (Shea 2010). As long as the quota obligations are met, farmers are generally free to grow whatever crops they desire and to sell their harvest at the market price.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, bold policies and institutional reforms were implemented to motivate greater production by rural households (Fan et al 2004). In 1978 the government introduced the household responsibility system, under which key land rights were reallocated from collective farms to rural households and the households were required to sell the grain to the government with some specified quota amount at contract prices in exchange for use rights to specific plots of land (Shea 2010). As long as the quota obligations are met, farmers are generally free to grow whatever crops they desire and to sell their harvest at the market price.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…119-124). Past farm policies took numerous forms, including export restrictions and requirements to deliver part of the crop to the government at below-market prices (Sicular, 1988; Shea, 2010), all of which are reflected in estimated NRAs that are negative. For some import-competing industries, though, restrictions on imports meant they enjoyed positive NRAs.…”
Section: Empirical Estimates Of Distortions To Farmer Incentives In Chinamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…et.al., (2014) thought that virtual water flow related to the grain resulted in negative impact on relevant development and induced to serious threat to food security. In addition, some researchers made relevant explanation on china's grain safety from many perspectives, such as global economy (Zhou, Xin, 2006), optimization (Shea, 2010), cultivated land (Zhang, 2013), economic ecologization (li, Zhang, 2016), macro economy (Xu, lu, Wang, 2016).…”
Section: The Question Proposedmentioning
confidence: 99%