Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour

Abstract

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link AbstractMemories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behavior. In Experiment 1, we challenged participants' beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants' belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving.

Creating nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions using an imagination inflation procedure

“…That is, in previous studies we have found that by challenging people's “normal” familiar memories, some behaviors could be changed. For example, Wang et al (2017) showed that undermining belief in false memories led to less efficient problem‐solving behavior. Future research might examine whether behavioral changes also occur when belief is undermined for more atypical events.…”

“…In past studies, researchers have used different methods to (experimentally) induce nonbelieved memories. Social feedback to experiences, such as being told by someone that the remembered event did not happen, has been shown to be a potent way to elicit nonbelieved memories (e.g., Otgaar, Moldoveanu, Wang, & Howe, 2017; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013; Wang et al, 2017). For example, Clark, Nash, Fincham, and Mazzoni (2012) provided participants with fake videos (i.e., the doctored‐video paradigm; Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009) to create nonbelieved memories.…”

The consequences of implicit and explicit beliefs on food preferences.

“…Research has shown that when participants are debriefed by telling them that they had false memories, participants will often reduce belief in their false memories (e.g., Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2012;Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013;Wang, Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, Merckelbach, & Nahouli, 2017).…”

What Drives False Memories in Psychopathology? A Case for Associative Activation

“…The standard finding is that CRAT problems primed by false memories for critical lures are solved more frequently than problems without priming. It is important that such priming effects seem to last after a delay of one week ( Howe, Wilkinson, & Monaghan, 2012 ; Wang et al, 2017 ). The longevity of associative activation is present not only in adults, but also in young children ( Hayne & Gross, 2017 ).…”