Uncommon among the Commons? Disentangling the Sustainability of the Peruvian Anchovy Fishery

Abstract

ABSTRACT. The term "commons" refers to collectively exploited resources and their systems of usage; a synonymous term is common pool resources. Fisheries are typical common pool resources and also one of the most conspicuous examples of unsustainable use of natural resources. We examine one of the few globally important fisheries that is held to be sustainable, the Peruvian anchovy fishery, and considers the extent to which the institutional characteristics of the fishery conform to design principles that are considered prerequisites for long-term, successful, community-based common pool resources. Results showed that greater conformity to the principles was found in the sustainable phase of the fishery, compared to its unsustainable phase. For this case study, the conditions that supported the transition towards sustainability were: clearly defined resource boundaries, monitoring of rule enforcement, and conflict resolution mechanisms among users and management authorities. On the other hand, clearly defined user boundaries, collective choice arrangements, and nested enterprises were not required to achieve sustainability. The study concludes that the design principles are a valuable tool for analysis and understanding of large-scale common pool resource systems. At the same time it suggests that the application of the principles to a wider range of systems can generate new insights into what is required for successful management of common pool resources.RESUMEN. Los "bienes comunes" se refieren colectivamente a los recursos explotados y sus sistemas de uso, y también se conocen como recursos de propiedad común (CPR). Los recursos marinos han sido considerados tradicionalmente como CPR y como uno de los ejemplos más conocidos de uso no sostenible de los recursos naturales. Este trabajo examina una de las escasas pesquerías importantes a nivel mundial que se considera sostenible -la pesquería de la Anchoveta peruana (Engraulis ringens), considerando el grado en que las características institucionales de esta pesquería se ajustan a los principios de diseño de gobernanza de recursos comunes que se consideran requisitos previos para el éxito a largo plazo en la gestión de CPR. Los resultados obtenidos mostraron que una mayor observancia y conformidad con los principios de diseño durante la fase sostenible de la pesquería, en comparación con su etapa insostenible. Para este caso de estudio cabe destacar que una clara definición de los límites de uso del recurso, la aplicación de reglas de supervisión y mecanismos de resolución de conflictos entre los usuarios y las autoridades de gestión, han sido todos ellos factores que han apoyado la transición hacia la sostenibilidad de la pesquería. Por otro lado, una clara definición de los límites de uso por parte de los usuarios, la elección de acuerdos colectivos y la unión entre empresas no han sido requisitos para lograr la sostenibilidad de la pesquería. Concluimos que el diseño de principios constituye una valiosa herramienta para el análisis y la comprensión de los gra...

Towards adaptive co-management of small-scale fisheries in Uruguay and Brazil: lessons from using Ostrom’s design principles

“…A single analysis of the principles would only give a snapshot. Therefore, principles should be analyzed over time, and the principles should be made or treated as dynamic, in the manner of Gelcich et al (2006); Yandle (2008) and Arias Schreiber and Halliday (2013), who analyzed the principles at two time periods. In our case studies, we attempted to do this by analyzing trends in social-ecological change when assessing the principles, and by illustrating the importance of changes by pointing out that the formation of the POPA group and its participatory research initiative (Trimble and Berkes 2013) made a difference in meeting at least two design principles.…”

“…Ostrom's (1990) eight design principles are remarkable in the scholarly literature about commons sustainability and collective action because they capture some of the commonalities regarding the necessary conditions. These principles have been used to evaluate and diagnose various resource systems, including fisheries (e.g., Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995;Gelcich et al 2006;Yandle 2008;Arias Schreiber and Halliday 2013;McClanahan et al 2013;Fleischman et al 2014;Galappaththi and Berkes 2015), and some are among the necessary conditions for co-management and adaptive co-management (e.g., Pomeroy 2007; Armitage et al 2009). Cox et al (2010) analyzed 91 of these studies and concluded that Ostrom's eight principles were well supported empirically, but suggested splitting three of them, in line with the evidence from the cases.…”

The Daudkandi model of community floodplain aquaculture in Bangladesh: a case for Ostrom’s design principles

“…Second, Ostrom argues that a self-governed CPR is one wherein 'major appropriators of the resource, are involved over time in making and adapting rules within collectivechoice arenas' and in our modern political economies it is highly usual that 'in a self-governed system, participants make many, but not necessarily all, rules that The Daudkandi model of community floodplain aquaculture in Bangladesh 857 affect the sustainability of the resource system and its use' (Ostrom 2002(Ostrom , 1317. Initially in the co-management era, primary partners in managing a resource were government and the users, and that regime has been looked into through Ostrom's framework (Yandle 2003(Yandle , 2008Gelcich et al 2006;Schreiber and Halliday 2013;McClanahan et al 2015). That clear dichotomy has changed in subsequent years through various experimentations, and in the case of present study, as will be shown, community users formed the main partnership with the NGO without any government initiative framework for and involvement in managing their resource.…”

“…However, the fulfilment of all these principles -about which none of the users had any previous idea-in field level is an extremely complex ongoing process. The sustainability of a CPR solely in terms of compliance with Ostrom's principles cannot be predicted as there is strong possibility of the presence of external factors like market demands or resource's various properties (Cox et al 2010;Schreiber and Halliday 2013). Cox et al (2010) also mentioned the limitations of Ostrom's principles in considering user community's internal power play.…”

“…Having these rules is an indication that, at least, at the design level the managers of CPR institution are capable, for the rules were designed on the basis of collaboration rather than one sided imposition of any partner. While the compliance with Ostrom's design principles indicates the capability of CPR institutions, the level of compliance may change for better or worse with passing of time as applications of these principles in cases of co-management institutions is found in several studies (Gelcich et al 2006;Yandle 2003Yandle , 2008Schreiber and Halliday 2013). It is important to remember that the involvement of the NGO is theoretically not necessary for the replication of models where landowners and community people themselves come together and work out their collaboration.…”