Uncertainty in Games: Using Probability-Distributions as Payoffs

Raß, Stefan; König, Sandra; Schauer, Stefan

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_20

Cited by 24 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The technicalities and theory behind the stochastic ordering and construction of stochastic games are of no interest in this work, but we refer the interested reader to the papers (Rass et al 2016; for more details. For example, (Rass et al 2015) reconstructs the entire theory of games based on any total stochastic order, such as the presented -order.…”

Section: Security Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk mitigation in electric power systems: Where to start?

Alshawish

Meer

2019

Energy Inform

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Power grids are becoming increasingly intelligent. In this regard, they benefit considerably from the information technology (IT) networks coupled with their underlying operational technology (OT) networks. While IT networks provide sufficient controllability and observability of power grid assets such as voltage and reactive power controllers, distributed energy resources, among others, they make those critical assets vulnerable to cyber threats and risks. In such systems, however, several technical and economic factors can significantly affect the patching and upgrading decisions of their components including, but not limited to, limited time and budget as well as legal constraints. Thus, resolving all vulnerabilities at once could seem like an insuperable hurdle. To figure out where to start, an involved decision maker (e.g. a security team) has to prudently prioritize the possible vulnerability remediation actions. The key objective of prioritization is to efficiently reduce the inherent security risk to which the system in question is exposed. Due to the critical role of power systems, their decision makers tend to enhance the system resilience against extreme events. Thus, they seek to avoid decision options associated with likely severe risks. Practically, this risk attitude guides the decision-making process in such critical organizations and hence the sought-after prioritization as well. Therefore, the contribution of this work is to provide an integrated risk-based decisionsupport methodology for prioritizing possible remediation activities. It leverages the Time-To-Compromise security metric to quantitatively assess the risk of compromise. The developed risk estimator considers several factors including: i) the inherent assessment uncertainty, ii) interdependencies between the network components, iii) different adversary skill levels, and iv) public vulnerability and exploit information. Additionally, our methodology employs game theory principles to support the strategic decision-making process by constructing a chain of security games. Technically, the remediation actions are prioritized through successively playing a set of dependent zero-sum games. The underlying game-theoretical model considers carefully the stochastic nature of risk assessments and the specific risk attitude of the decision makers involved in the patch management process across electric power organizations.

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Section: Security Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk mitigation in electric power systems: Where to start?

Alshawish

Meer

2019

Energy Inform

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“…The identification and analysis of composite interdependencies between supply chain entities and their cyber-assets drive the process of assessing the propagation of incidents through multiple ICT networks. An application of game-theoretic algorithms yields the recognition of optimal mitigation actions, capturing a worst-case scenario damage for the defender, based on the game-theoretic risk management approach described in Reference [59], the mathematical module for uncertain payoffs described in Reference [60] and potential attack strategies presented in References [57,58,61]. In this context, the MITIGATE methodology focuses on the following objectives:…”

Section: An Evidence-driven Holistic Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The modeling of supply chain services elicits information about the main cyberdependencies that exist among assets. A cyberdependency of assets is considered a pair cyber-asset (node) interrelation and/or interconnection (edge) aiming to fulfil an electronic service/operation across communication networks [55,59]. The MITIGATE methodology assumes a twofold dependency concept: (i) The dependency type and (ii) the dependency access vector.…”

Section: A Novel Integrated Risk Management System and Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Supply Chain Risk Management (Sas-7)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, the proposed system provides the necessary defensive capabilities and supports a rational decision-making to determine which security controls must be implemented and which partners need to implement them to encounter the identified security issues and cyber-risks. Since all defence strategies and the corresponding payoffs have been determined, the game-theoretic algorithm implementation, which is analytically presented in References [59,60], delivers an optimal way of selecting actions both of the attacker and defender. This equilibrium has a twofold notion: (i) To protect the assets by adopting the proper proposed security measures that eliminate the damage; (ii) to identify the highest damage an adversary may cause to the business partner and indicate the defense strategy that deviates the attacker from this optimal solution providing the minimum business partner's loss.…”

Section: Supply Chain Risk Management (Sas-7)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Novel Risk Assessment Methodology for SCADA Maritime Logistics Environments

et al. 2018

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In recent years maritime logistics infrastructures are the global links among societies and economies. This challenges adversaries to intrude on the cyber-dependent ICTs by performing high-level intelligent techniques. A potential cyber-attack on such infrastructures can cause tremendous damages starting from supply chain service disruption ending up with threatening the whole human welfare. Current risk management policies embed significant limitations in terms of capturing the specific security requirements of ICTs and control/monitoring devices, such as IoT platforms, satellites and time installations, which are primary functioning for the provision of Maritime Logistics and Supply Chain (MLoSC) services. This work presents a novel risk assessment methodology capable of addressing the security particularities and specificities of the complex nature of SCADA infrastructures and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) of the Maritime Logistics Industry. The methodology identifies asset vulnerabilities and threats to estimate the cyber-risks and their cascading effects within the supply chain, introducing a set of subsequent security assessment services. The utilization of these services is demonstrated via a critical, real-life SCADA scenario indicating how they can facilitate supply chain operators in comprehending the threat landscape of their infrastructures and guide them how to adopt optimal mitigation strategies to counter or eliminate their cyber-risks.

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