2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/Ispa 2015
DOI: 10.1109/trustcom.2015.500
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Unblocking Stolen Mobile Devices Using SS7-MAP Vulnerabilities: Exploiting the Relationship between IMEI and IMSI for EIR Access

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Cited by 26 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…These technologies can be classified into two groups: virtual identifiers and physical identifiers. Currently, the most popular identifiers (IMEI, MAC-address) are recorded into the memory of the device [58], which makes them vulnerable to cloning and tampering [59]- [62]. An alternative recently was proposed a concept of hybrid identifier [58], which is significantly more resilient to tampering and potentially may address the issue of reliable device identification in the network.…”
Section: B Network and Mac Levelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These technologies can be classified into two groups: virtual identifiers and physical identifiers. Currently, the most popular identifiers (IMEI, MAC-address) are recorded into the memory of the device [58], which makes them vulnerable to cloning and tampering [59]- [62]. An alternative recently was proposed a concept of hybrid identifier [58], which is significantly more resilient to tampering and potentially may address the issue of reliable device identification in the network.…”
Section: B Network and Mac Levelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[67], [68], [69] U V-A1 TMSI Deanonymization (Paging Attack) [4], [5], [86] U V-A1 Cell-Level Tracking with SS7/MAP [56] U V-D1 GPS Location with SS7/LCS [56] U V-D1 Integrity ASN.1 Heap Overflow [87] U,P VI-A1 Binary Baseband Exploit [11], [88], [89] U VI-A1 SMS Parsing [90], [91] U VI-A1 SIM Card Rooting [85] U VI-A1 Fraud Fake Base Station SMS Spam [92], [93] U V-B1 LTE IMS-based SMS Spoofing [83], [94] U VII-A1 Misbilling: TCP Retransmission or DNS Tunneling [95], [95], [96] P VII-B1 Underbilling using VoLTE Hidden Channels [97], [98] P VII-B1 Uplink IP Header Spoofing/Cloak-and-Dagger Misbilling [28], [99] U VII-A1 Unblock Stolen Devices [100] U V-D1 yes, applicable, needed for attack partially/supportive/optional no, not applicable, or does not apply ? property unknown not depend on a specification and can be implemented directly into network components.…”
Section: H Defensesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They appear to downplay the importance of SS7 network security, despite being provided with all the relevant information. Because older technologies are still widely in use for roaming and as temporary solutions (CSFB), quite a few attack vectors take advantage of interworking between the technologies (see [3] for one example).…”
Section: Telecom Security Audits: Real-world Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Current research on Diameter security shows that it is possible to gather information about subscribers [1][2][3], locate and track them [1,2], and perform denial of service (DoS) attacks on them [1,2].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%